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ABSTRACT 
In reductionist biology, mental states are brain states and the 
brain obeys the laws of a physical world existing independently of and prior 
to minds. This account i s invalidated i f the physical laws themselves 
involve e s s e n t i a l reference to mental states.. The quantum theory has 
usually been presented in a form making such reference. . 
To remove the need for t h i s , the f i r s t step i s to accept that 
quantum theory applies only to f i e l d s and to e n t i t i e s embedded in f i e l d s . 
Ehrenfest's theorem then shows how systems obeying Newtonian mechanics, 
including objects of everyday l i f e , appear as persistent patterns showing 
none of the indeterminacy associated with features of the underlying f i e l d . 
The theorems of Gleason, Kocken and Specker demand that the quantum 
theory should leave a degree of indeterminacy in the pattern of the f i e l d s i t 
describes. Any interaction of a quantum system with i t s environment 
therefore requires a d e f i n i t e selection of a unique pattern of behaviour 
within the range of indeterminacy.Such interaction i s continuous, and there 
i s no role for a mental state in t h i s selection. 
I t would be consistent with the formalism of quantum theory i f a 
lo c a l i s e d interaction in a system caused an instantaneous removal of 
indeterminacy over an a r b i t r a r i l y large volume, in apparent c o n f l i c t with the 
s p e c i a l theory of r e l a t i v i t y . This c o n f l i c t i s not removed by any appeal to 
the e f f e c t s of mental states.. However, a consistent interpretation of 
quantum systems as f i e l d s throws doubt on the claim that the event 
correlations in the experiments of Aspect and his colllaborators are evidence 
of causal propagation at speeds greater than that of light. 
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SUMMARY ; QUANTUM THEORY AND THE MIND BRAIN RELATION 
A physical world, independent of mental states and pre-existing 
them, i s a presupposition in many evolutionary account of experience. In 
some of these,states of the mind are taken to be reducible to states of the 
brain, and processes in the brain are taken to obey the same laws as those of 
the physical world. This reductionist approach i s barred i f the laws of the 
physical world cannot be formulated without reference to mental e n t i t i e s . I t 
i s of great significance therefore outside physics that, throughout i t s 
history, quantum theory has commonly been presented as making es s e n t i a l 
reference to observers, conscious states or measurements, and hence, 
d i r e c t l y or i n d i r e c t l y to mental states. The aim here i s to show that such 
reference can be eliminated without affecting the way quantum theory i s 
ac t u a l l y used. 
In general, quantum theory assigns probabilities to a range of 
outcomes, rather than a unique outcome, to a quantum process. I t gives no 
account of the mechanism by which the actual outcome i s selected from the 
range of p o s s i b i l i t i e s . Moreover, i f the quantum theory i s supposed to 
apply to a l l possible systems, including for instance systems of free 
p a r t i c l e s or of macroscopic bodies, i t i s d i f f i c u l t to s u r e s t any plausible 
mechanism for t h i s selection. I t i s in t h i s connection that some have seen 
a role for mental states. In a different approach, the obviously permissible 
assumption i s made in t h i s work that the theory applies only to those kinds 
of physical systems for which ph y s i c i s t s actually use i t . I t then appears 
that quantum theory i s primarily the mechanics of the microstructure of the 
electromagnetic f i e l d , although also adaptable to f i e l d s associated with the 
weak and strong forces of physics. Quantum p a r t i c l e s are then aspects of 
the behaviour of f i e l d s , the structure of which are determined by a l l 
boundaries, internal and external, of the region containing them. 
Ehrenfest's theorem, derivable within quantum theory, then shows how 
the quantum substructure underlies and i s compatible with systems which obey 
c l a s s i c a l mechanics and lack the currently irremovable indeterminacy of some 
of the properties of their microconstituents such as electrons. This solves 
the so-called "measurement problem" and eliminates necessary reference to 
observer-related measurement systems. 
Indeterminacy must be retained for the quantum microstructure to 
explain the single outcome ,from the range of p o s s i b i l i t i e s permitted by 
quantum theory, without recourse to interaction with observers (or other 
e n t i t i e s not supposed to be governed by quantum laws).. This then leaves 
quantum theory e n t i r e l y independent of any essential reference to mental 
e n t i t i e s . The p o s i b i l i t y need not be excluded that indeterminacy at the 
quantum l e v e l may be based upon determinacy at some finer l e v e l of analysis, 
e.g. in some "hidden variable" formulation, but t h i s would not affect the 
present arguments, and i t i s c e r t a i n l y not required to j u s t i f y them. 
I t would be consistent with the quantum theory to see the range of 
outcomes permitted by the theory as accessible to a single quantum system, 
and hence to take the p r o b a b i l i t i e s as propensities of a single system, 
rather than as frequencies in a population of s i m i l a r l y prepared systems. 
This would, however,leave problems in our account of macroscopic bodies, and 
i t i s therefore necessary to suppose that both v a r i e t i e s of probability are 
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w i t h a l i m i t e d range of p r o p e r i s i t i e s open to each system of a 
population and a wider range of p o s s i b i l i t i e s a r i s i n g from a frequency 
d i s t r i b u t i o n i n a population of systems. 
I n t e r p r e t e d i n t h i s way, the quantum theory does not r e q u i r e a c t i o n 
a t a d i s t a n c e , or c a u s a l e f f e c t s transmitted a t speeds g r e a t e r than that of 
l i g h t , to account f o r c o r r e l a t i o n s i t p r e d i c t s between separated p a r t s of 
quantum systems. In the present account, the e x i s t e n c e of such e f f e c t s i s 
an e m p i r i c a l matter, a t present undecided. Experiments, such as those of 
Aspect and h i s co-workers on photon p a i r c o r r e l a t i o n s , do not unambiguously 
e x h i b i t a c t i o n a t a d i s t a n c e . T h i s i s because r a d i a t i o n emission, p o l a r i s e r 
r e f l e c t i o n and p h o t o m u l t i p l i e r e x c i t a t i o n a r e a l l f i e l d - r e l a t e d or f i e l d 
induced. The f i e l d s t r u c t u r e connects the c h o i c e between det e c t i o n and 
non-detection a t a p h o t o m u l t i p l i e r to a c e r t a i n consonance betwen p o l a r i s e r 
s e t t i n g and emission parameters. No c a u s a l e f f e c t i s t h e r e f o r e transmitted 
: i t i s i n h e r e n t i n the set-up. Aspect's second experiment switched beams 
between p a i r s of p o l a r i s e r s a t f i x e d angles, but low d e t e c t i o n r a t e s a t the 
p h o t o m u l t i p l i e r s l e a v e s open the p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t only photons with emission 
parameters consonant w i t h p o l a r i s e r angles a c t u a l l y met would ac t u a t e the 
p h o t o m u l t i p l i e r s . 
T h i s p r e s e n t a t i o n not only e l i m i n a t e s mental e n t i t i e s , i t i s a l s o 
c o n s i s t e n t w i t h conceptual schemes used to i n t e r p r e t the formalism of quantum 
theory by working p h y s i c i s t s . I t i s very c l o s e to the ideas of the so-
c a l l e d Copenhagen s c h o o l , d e s p i t e the support the l a t t e r i s supposed to give 
to s u b j e c t i v i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s . The main departure here from Bohr and 
Heisenberg i s the r e j e c t i o n of t h e i r s t a t i c view of human powers of 
r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of p h y s i c a l e n t i t i e s i n mental p i c t u r e s . With t h i s proviso 
the account given here i s the metaphysics of the p r a c t i s i n g p h y s i c i s t . 
QUANTUM THEORY AND THE MIND-BRAIN FELATION 
BACKGROUND 
Since the 1920's, the quantum theory in physics has frequently 
(and perhaps usually) been presented in a form which would have profound 
implications in philosophy.More narrowly, keeping within the boundaries of 
science, the quantum theory in t h i s form would appear to be incompatible with 
that school of neurology which proceeds from a reductionist standpoint, 
taking mental states to be brain states, with the ultimate ambition of 
explaining psychology in terms of processes in neuron networks. 
I am here concerned to show that the quantum theory need not be 
presented in t h i s form. In doing so, I believe I also r i d quantum theory 
of what some would consider i t s more puzzling philosophical implications, 
such as i t s apparent incompatibility with an objective physical world 
preceding and existing independently of subjective e n t i t i e s such as minds or 
observers. However, I emphasise the implications for neurobiology because 
these have had l e s s attention than those for philosophy, and also because I 
find i t p a r t i c u l a r l y odd that the implications of one widely practised branch 
of science on another should be so neglected. 
As an i l l u s t r a t i o n of t h i s neglect, a comprehensive review of the 
mind-brain problem (Churchland, 1986) gives a very f u l l account of the 
reductionist controversy in biology in general and in mind-brain studies in 
p a r t i c u l a r . However, i t contains no reference at a l l to the support which 
the quantum theory in a widely accepted form gives to d u a l i s t i c and non-
reductionist theories of the mind-brain. 
This i s not because practitioners in the f i e l d of neurobiology are 
t o t a l l y unaware of the general character of quantum theory. Indeed, 
Churchland's review gives due attention to matters in quantum theory which 
appear to her to have relevance to her f i e l d , for example when she quotes the 
use of vectors in Hilbert spaces in quantum theory as a precedent for their 
application to neural networks. She also discusses the explanation of 
chemical bonding in quantum theory as an example of reductionism in a non-
b i o l o g i c a l science. 
Nor i s i t because the reductionist school in neurology holds such 
sway that the d i f f i c u l t i e s i t may engender in physics appear of l i t t l e 
consequence: as Churchland's review shows,reductionism in biology i s 
currently a highly controversial matter. One might have supposed therefore 
that opponents of reductionism would have quoted the s u b j e c t i v i s t trend in 
quantum theory in support of their views. This, i t appears, i s haxdly ever 
done. 
My concern here i s to show that the supposed implications of 
quantum theory for reductionism in biology are not sustainable, rather than 
to explain the lack of i n t e r - d i s c i p l i n a r y discussion of them. My own 
interest in t h i s matter a r i s e s of course from a reluctance to accept that the 
quantum theory c o n f l i c t s with accounts of the mind-brain relation which I 
find acceptable. 
KEDUCTIONISM IN NEUKDBIOLOGY 
No detailed account i s needed here of the various interpretations 
of the mind-brain relation which underlie investigation in a range of 
bi o l o g i c a l , psychological, neurological and a r t i f i c i a l intelligence topics. 
Churchland's review gives a f u l l coverage of these matters, with extensive 
references. A l l that i s required are i l l u s t r a t i o n s of the kind of thinking 
in these f i e l d s which appear incon^'atible with s u b j e c t i v i s t accounts of the 
quantum theory. 
Starting from r e l a t i v e l y uncontroversial matters, the brain i s a 
co l l e c t i o n of c e l l s organised to control bodily a c t i v i t y , and to conduct t h i s 
control in rel a t i o n to representations of the world. The brain also 
processes the sensory signals used to modify these representations or add to 
them. Associated with the brain are mental states such as perceptions, 
thoughts, feelings and sensations. Some mental states are conscious states. 
Mental states influence and are influenced by the processes and properties of 
the brain with which they are associated. The mind i s the locus of mental 
sta t e s . 
To turn to controversial matters, accounts of the mind-brain 
r e l a t i o n may for present purposes be c l a s s i f i e d as dualist or as 
reductionist. According to the d u a l i s t s , processes in the mind cannot be 
interpreted coirpletely in terms of processes taking place within the brain 
and obeying the same laws as non-mental processes. Some dua l i s t s view the 
mind as a substance separate from the brain, even capable of existence 
independently of i t . Other d u a l i s t s accept that a l l mind states are brain 
states, but s t i l l maintain that mental processes are not, and never w i l l be, 
explicable in terms of physical processes in collections of brain c e l l s . 
As opposed to the d u a l i s t s , reductionists see mental states as 
brain states and hold that the processes and properties of the brain follow 
the same physical laws as those of non-mental processes. 
The reductionist does not of course argue that neuroscience i s yet 
s u f f i c i e n t l y advanced to give a f u l l account of mental processes in terms of 
neural networks. He would point out here to analogies with, say, chemistry 
or thermodynamics. The laws of chemistry can now be interpreted in terms of 
quantum theory applied to electron systems in atoms and molecules, but u n t i l 
the 2nd or 3rd decade of t h i s century the reduction of chemistry to physics, 
athough widely expected, was not in fact achievable. Similarly, 
thermodynamics can now be based on s t a t i s t i c a l mechanics but the development 
of c l a s s i c a l thermodynamics preceded i t s s t a t i s t i c a l interpretation. 
Looking at the problem in t h i s way, i t i s tempting to suggest that 
we are dealing with an empirical question, in the sense that we s h a l l know 
whether psychology, perception and memory can be reduced to processes in 
neural networks when the reduction has in fact been achieved. Until then, 
i t may be said, we can leave the question in suspense. This view i s 
unappealing to either side in the controversy. Many dua l i s t s believe they 
can show here and now that a complete reduction of mind states to brain 
st a t e s i s impossible. They say, for instance, that the structure of 
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langusse i t s e l f forbids i t , in that there are propositions sbont the mind 
that cannot be propositions about the brain and vice versa (A neuronal 
network obeying physical laws cannot harbour a desire for revenge, and I 
cannot have a tumour in my mind). 
The reductionist in his turn might be unwilling to leave the matter 
in suspense because the supposition of a separate mental substance or of 
separate laws governing mental processes gives r i s e to grave d i f f i c u l t i e s for 
an understanding of the evolution of l i v i n g organisms. At what stage did 
t h i s mental substance appear, or at what stage did non-physical laws begin to 
operate. Has a b a c t e r i a l c e l l got i t s quota of mental substance ? I s i t 
l i k e l y we s h a l l ever have to appeal to non-physical laws to account for 
processes in the b a c t e r i a l c e l l ? 
However t h i s may be, i t i s clear that the reductionist position 
becomes untenable i f the physical laws themselves imply the existence of 
mental systems not governed by physical laws. Mental states cannot be 
interpreted in terms of neural networks obeying physical laws i f the 
physical laws themselves cannot be understood without appealing to mental 
processes. 
Later I w i l l discuss in more d e t a i l the reasons for supposing that 
quantum theory has these implications (and of course why I consider these 
reasons i n s u f f i c i e n t ) . For the present the matter can be put b r i e f l y as 
follows. In general, quantum theory gives probabilities to a range of 
possible outcomes of a given i n i t i a l state. The unique outcome presented in 
any p a r t i c u l l a r case i s supposed in some interpretations to a r i s e in the 
course of interaction of the physical system with a mental system (for 
example, a state of consciousness). In le s s extreme interpretations, the 
interaction giving the unique outcome i s between the physical system and a 
measurement system. Since a measurement system can be identified as such 
only by reference to mental states (i.e.those of the observer using the 
measurement system), t h i s l e s s extreme interpretation i s s t i l l f a t a l to the 
reductionist argument, which to avoid c i r c u l a r i t y requires physical laws 
which make no reference, implied or e j ^ l i c i t , to mental states. 
I t i s my intention then to argue that quantum mechanics, as i t was 
developed in the 20's and 30's of t h i s century, can be r i d of these 
s u b j e c t i v i s t interpretations without affecting in any way what working 
p h y s i c i s t s so successfully do with quantum mechanics. To do t h i s , I must 
f i r s t give some consideration to aspects of c l a s s i c a l dynamics and c l a s s i c a l 
electromagnetic theory, since quantum theory makes essential reference to 
concepts such as energy and the electromagnetic f i e l d which are characterised 
in the c l a s s i c a l theories rather than in quantum theory. 
f 
CLASSICAL DYNAMICS 
For the present purpose, the central feature of c l a s s i c a l dynamics 
i s that of determining the evolution in time, from a given i n i t i a l state, of 
any physical system for which a Hamiltonian function can be defined. The 
Hamiltonian i s a function of coordinates specifying completely the 
configuration of the system, and also of a set of quantities, equal in number 
to the coordinates, known as "momenta". Corresponding pairs of coordinates 
and momenta obey a set of Hamilton's equations 
^^^^ cit ' c)p-r 
where t represents time, H i s the Hamiltonian function and q^,p^ are a 
coordinate and i t s corresponding momentum respectively. 
We are concerned with what Whittaker (1944) called "natural 
systems", for which H i s numerically equal to the t o t a l energy of the system, 
i.e . the sum of i t s ki n e t i c and potential energy. Whether suitable kinetic 
and potential energy functions can be formulated for a particular physical 
system i s an empirical question, but such functions are well known for a 
large v a r i e t y of physical systems. 
For the present purpose, the important point i s that the existence 
of a Hamiltonian and, i f i t e x i s t s , the coordinates required for i t s 
expression, are matters for investigation for each particular c l a s s of 
system. The relevance of t h i s to electromagnetic systems w i l l be considered 
below. 
Another feature of c l a s s i c a l dynamics w i l l also be relevant. During 
the 17th and 18th centuries the development of the concept of energy was slow 
and d i f f i c u l t (Mach 1960). I t was not (and may be s t i l l not now)easy to get 
a mental image of a common entity to be associated with the kinetic and 
potential energies of a system, and s t i l l l e s s easy to generalise any such 
image to the wide variety of systems to which the concept of energy i s 
applicable. 
The concept of energy would not have been explicable in terms of 
human experience before the 16th century. The widening range of human 
experience requires a widening range of concepts. I s h a l l argue below that 
a f a i l u r e to recognise t h i s led Bohr and the Copenhagen school to make an 
un j u s t i f i a b l e d i s t i n c t i o n between e n t i t i e s of quantum mechanics and those of 
c l a s s i c a l mechanics. The e n t i t i e s appearing in quantum mechanics have 
features not readily modelled in terms of those familiar in early physics, 
j u s t as energy in c l a s s i c a l ' mechanics was not readily modelled in terms of 
the ideas of 16th century science. In due course quantum systems w i l l lose 
t h e i r strangeness, j u s t as ki n e t i c and potential energy have long ago lost 
t h e i r strangeness. With t h i s proviso, the views of Bohr and the Copenhagen 
school w i l l appear close to those which I am advocating here. 
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CLAS.SICAL ELECTFiOMAGNETISM 
I s h a l l argue below that the philosophical problems of quantum 
theory arose in part from an un j u s t i f i e d assumption that quantum mechanics, 
in the form considered here, had the same wide range of supplication as 
c l a s s i c a l mechanics, but extending beyond the l a t t e r to micro-phenomena. 
For macroscopic processes, c l a s s i c a l mechanics was to be regarded as a 
s u f f i c i e n t l y accurate ^proximation, but becoming increasingly invalid at the 
atomic scale and below. In principle, however, quantum mechanics was 
supposed to embrace a l l processes covered by c l a s s i c a l mechanics, although 
giving r e s u l t s indistinguishable for p r a c t i c a l purposes from those of 
c l a s s i c a l mechanics on the macroscopic scale. 
In fact, quantum mechanics in the form considered here was supplied 
almost exclusively to electromagnetic phenomena on the small scale (including 
such things as atoms and molecules or electrons in c r y s t a l l i n e solids,for 
which the energy i s expressed in electromagnetic terms). At t h i s point then 
i t i s appropriate to consider some important features of electromagnetic 
phenomena. 
Unlike, say, systems of massive bodies interacting by gravitational 
forces, electromagnetic systems cannot, except in special cases, be 
represented by Hamiltonian functions of interacting p a r t i c l e s , forces between 
pa i r s of which act along the l i n e s joining them. For a pair of charged 
p a r t i c l e s in r e l a t i v e motion, the e l e c t r o s t a t i c part of the force between 
them does indeed act along the lin e joining them, but the magnetic part of 
the force does not. 
This feature of electromagnetic systems has for the present purpose 
an important consequence, namely that the Hamiltonian function cannot be 
expressed in terms of the sum of the kinetic energies of point p a r t i c l e s and 
of a potential energy dependent only on the instantaneous coordinates of 
point p a r t i c l e s . (Goldstein 1959, p9). For the simplest case of a charged 
p a r t i c l e in an electromagnetic f i e l d , the Hamiltonian i s ((Joldstein,1959, 
p. 222) 
H = l/2m(p-qA/c)V qV 
where m i s the mass associated with the charged p a r t i c l e , q i t s charge 
p i s the canonical momentum vector 
A i s the vector potential and 
V the scala r potential 
c i s the veloc i t y of ligh t 
I take t h i s formulation of H to imply that in an electromagnetic 
system the charged p a r t i c l e s are embedded in a f i e l d , and the mechanics of 
the system cannot in general be treated without reference to the f i e l d . The 
f i e l d quantities A and V may of course be regarded as determined by the 
d i s t r i b u t i o n of charges and their v e l o c i t i e s , but i t i s equally v a l i d to 
regard the charges and their v e l o c i t i e s as determine>d by the c o n f i g u r a t i o n of 
the f i e l d quantities A and V. Whichever point of view i s taken, allowance i s 
made for macroscopic boundaries to the f i e l d (screens, apertures, 
equipotential surfaces e t c ) , the effects of which are supposed to be known 
without detailed analysis of thei r fine structures. 
The charged p a r t i c l e s of c l a s s i c a l electromagnetics are therefore 
embedded in f i e l d s , the structures of which r e f l e c t not only the 
dist r i b u t i o n s and v e l o c i t i e s of the charged p a r t i c l e s but also the 
macroscopic boundaries of the f i e l d . In what follows I take t h i s 
generalisation to apply to a l l systems to which quantum mechanics can be 
applied. 
I am claiming therefore that neither c l a s s i c a l electromagnetism, 
nor quantum theory, which i s a fine structure refinement of i t , have any 
place for the isolated, or even intermittently isolated, p a r t i c l e . An 
isolated p a r t i c l e may tr a v e l along a definite trajectory defined by apertures 
in screens. The screens themselves, and any apertures in them not 
characterising the trajectory, may be supposed to have no influence on the 
behaviour of the p a r t i c l e . The presence of the screens merely assures the 
absence of p a r t i c l e s not belonging to a particular trajectory. 
P a r t i c l e s , screens and apertures of t h i s kind are not the subject 
of c l a s s i c a l electromagnetism or of quantum theory. For these theories, 
p a r t i c l e s are aspects of the behaviour of f i e l d s , and the structure of a 
f i e l d i s determined among other things by the distribution of the boundaries 
(including screens and apertures) relevant to any particular case. This 
property of a f i e l d i s of course an ess e n t i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of our 
understanding of what a f i e l d i s . 
For our present purpose, quantum mechanics may be regarded as a 
theory of the electromagnetic f i e l d , since i t s applications to non-
electromagnetic systems were at f i r s t few and received l i t t l e attention in 
discussions of the philosophical problems of quantum theory.Systems involving 
the weak and strong forces have since been treated by developments of quantum 
mechanics but I s h a l l not deal with these,except to say that here too we 
appear to have f i e l d s as primary e n t i t i e s . I t has long been recognised that 
many problems are solved i f quantum systems are always primarily f i e l d 
systems, and never systems of autonomous p a r t i c l e s . However, early attempts 
to develop t h i s idea were frustrated by the choice of the Schrodinger 
function as the f i e l d function. The Schrodinger function has representation 
in a space of as many dimensions as the system in question has degrees of 
freedom, and cannot therefore serve as a f i e l d function in r e a l 3-dimensional 
space. 
For my present purpose i t i s not necessary to suppose that much or 
a l l of quantum theory can be derived by r e l a t i v e l y minor adjustments to 
c l a s s i c a l electromagnetic theory. I t i s no doubnt of great significance 
that so much of the broad character of quantum systems i s given by the use of 
Maxwell's equations along with the assumption of a universal randomness in 
the electromagnetic f i e l d , as i s done in so-called stochastic electromagnetic 
theories (see for instance T. Marshall. E. Santos 1988).For my purpose,it i s 
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enough that the quantum theory i s i t s e l f that modification required to 
c l a s s i c a l electromagnetic theory on the small scale when the effects of the 
universal zero point f i e l d can no longer be neglected. 
I t i s in any case irrelevant to our present purpose that the quantum 
theory w i l l in due course be embedded in some more general theory. I t i s 
fundamental to the philosophical stance underlying t h i s paper that any 
s c i e n t i f i c theory which has broad p r a c t i c a l application does so in virtue of 
an isomorphism between elements of the structure of the theory on the one 
hand and elements of the structure of an objective r e a l i t y on the other hand. 
I t must follow that any v a l i d s c i e n t i f i c theory must permit presentation in a 
form which i s free from subjective aspects such as observers, d e i t i e s , 
consciousness etc. Ptolemy's geocentric astronomy was successfully applied 
by ancient navigators, and Ptolemy's astronomy i s e a s i l y freed of reference 
to d e i t i e s embodied in the s t a r s and planets. Egyptian astronomy gave r i s e 
to a calendar and to useable predictions of the annual Nile floods, and again 
Egyptian astronomy i s e a s i l y detachable from the pantheon associated with i t 
by an Egyptian p r i e s t l y caste. 
Quantum theory too has had wide p r a c t i c a l application in the form 
with which I am here concerned, and i t too must be presentable without 
reference to subjective e n t i t i e s . This i s the purpose of the present p ^ e r , 
and i t i s apparent that t h i s purpose would not be served merely by showing 
that the quantum theory with i t s subjective trappings w i l l in due course be 
replaced by some more general theory without them. I t i s the quantum theory 
in the form used to interpret spectra and s o l i d state physics which must be 
freed of subjective reference, and to do t h i s I must now look at t h i s theory 
more close l y . 
THE SCHRODINGER EQUATION 
I s h a l l discuss quantum thoery as developed on the basis of the 
Schrodinger equation. I t appears generally accepted that the alternative 
development using matrix mechanics and commutivity rules i s formally 
equivalent to the form I s h a l l discuss, and I therefore assume that any 
conclusions I reach about the l a t t e r apply to the former also. 
The Schrodinger equation (1) for any quantum system i s a second 
order p a r t i a l d i f f e r e n t i a l equation rel a t i n g the Schrodinger function U as 
dependent variable to time and to variables specifying the configuration of 
the system ^ / j 
HU = i-h | y (1) 
Here H i s a linear d i f f e r e n t i a l operator derivable from the Hamiltonian 
function of the system, considered c l a s s i c a l l y . 
A solution to t h i s equation, for given i n i t i a l and boundary 
conditions, i s an ej^^ression for the Schrodinger function in terms of time 
and the configuration variables. 
Unlike the solutions to Hamilton's equations in c l a s s i c a l dynamics, 
the solution to the Schrodinger equation does not give a unique configuration 
for the system for a pa r t i c u l a r value of the time variable. Instead, i t 
allows the calculation of a probability that at a particular time the system 
w i l l react as i f i t had a particular set of values for the coordinates 
s 
s p e c i f y i n g i t s c o n f i g u r a t i o n and f o r the corresponding momenta. ( I also 
leave for l a t e r discussion the question whether the system may be supposed to 
possess these values before i t r e a c t s ) . 
The procedure i s as follows. For each coordinate and momentum 
characterising a quantum system there can be found a corresponding linear 
operator. The ide n t i f i c a t i o n of the linear operator agppropriate to a 
par t i c u l a r case i s not a straightforward matter, and appears to depend upon 
int u i t i o n based upon c l a s s i c a l mechanics rather than quantum mechanics. 
However,for my purpose I need not pursue t h i s matter. I w i l l sinply assume 
that the p o s s i b i l i t y of identifying such linear operators i s a cha r a c t e r i s t i c 
of quantum systems. This may imply a r e s t r i c t i v e view of the scope of 
quantum mechanics, but i t w i l l be recalled that I s t a r t out with doubts about 
i t s u n i v e r s a l i t y . I t i s s u f f i c i e n t for me that for systems represented in 
Cartesian coordinates the appropriate linear operator i s obtained from the 
c l a s s i c a l ejqpression for the corresponding dynamical variable by treating 
each coordinate x as a multiplicative operator and i t s paired momentum by the 
operator- ifi^/8x 
Such an operator, denoted by L, i s used to define a set of 
eigenvalues a^, and eigenfunctions v^v by the equation 
LVrt, = an vn (2) 
I f certain mathematical conditions are s a t i s f i e d by L, such eigenfunctions 
e x i s t and have a property known as "conpleteness" which implies that 
a r b i t r a r y functions of quite broad types can be expressed as sums of series 
of the functions. The operators occurring in the applications of quantum 
theory s a t i s f y the conditions, so that i t i s possible to express the 
Schrodinger function U for an arbitrary quantum system in the form 
U = Srn v^ (3) 
where S represents a summation which may become an integration in a region 
where the dist r i b u t i o n of eigenvalues becomes continuous. 
Now i t i s supposed to be known how the possession of a set of values 
for i t s dynamical variables governs the interaction of a quantum system with 
other systems. The nature of t h i s knowledge i s again not a straightforwaixl 
matter, and appears to involve in varying degrees c l a s s i c a l mechanics,quantum 
mechanics, and adaptations of procedures to f i t the facts in well-
investigated analogous situations. I t i s no part of the present task to 
consider to what extent the use of quantum mechanics depends upon ad hoc 
appeals to c l a s s i c a l mechanics and to special rules not deducible from the 
postulates of quantum mechanics (as when Schrodinger functions for electrons 
in molecules are in part derived from the known geometries of molecules). 
I t i s s u f f i c i e n t here that the working phy s i c i s t can relate the behaviour of 
a quantum system to values of i t s dynamical variables. 
The values of dynamical variables of a quantum system are derived 
from i t s Schrodinger functions in the following way. According to quantum 
theory, the possible values of a dynamical variable are the eigenvalues a 
of i t s corresponding operator L as given by equation ( 2 ) . The probability 
that in any part i c u l a r situation the quantum system exhibits behaviour 
appropriate to the value a^ of the dynamical variable i s proportional to the 
square of the modulus of the coefficient of the corresponding v^, in the 
expansion of i t s Schrodinger function in terms of the eigenfunctions of the 
operator corresponding to the dynamical variable. The set of eigenfunctions 
can be normalised so that 
where P^ i s the probability that the system would exhibit behaviour 
appropriate to the value a^. of the dynamical variable and r^ ^^  i s the 
co e f f i c i e n t of v^ . in equation ( 3 ) . 
The above follows cl o s e l y the usual treatment of the Schrodinger 
equation in textbooks (e.g. chapter 3 of L . I . S c h i f f , 1968) but d i f f e r s from 
the majority of them in one respect. For me, the P^ , in (4) measures the 
probability that the system should exhibit behaviour appropriate to the value 
of a>t , whereas most textbooks take the probability as that of getting a^, as 
the r e s u l t of a measurement of the dynamical variable. The former 
assumption i s more general, since any measurement on a system i s an 
exhibition of a pa r t i c u l a r behaviour by the system, but the converse i s of 
course not true. 
An example may c l a r i f y the d i s t i n c t i o n I am making. A track in a 
bubble chamber i s a measurement of the positions of a pcurticle at a 
succession of times.A trace in a rock of a Devonian radioactive decay i s a 
si m i l a r physical process but i t i s not a measurement. 
The modification to the common textbook approach i s necessary to the 
objective of ridding quantum theory of a l l reference to subjective e n t i t i e s , 
since measurements can be distinguished from interactions in general only by 
reference to a measurer. I t leaves the subsequent development of quantum 
mechanics unaffected.However, the view taken on what happens to a quantum 
system in the absence of measurement ( i n particular in the absence of an 
interaction between the system and a mental sta t e ) has profound implications 
for any account of the rela t i o n between physical states and mental states. 
I t i s worth noting that the denial of any special distinction between 
measurements and other interactions has always had support among some 
ph y s i c i s t s and philosophers. Among these are Born (Jammer 1974, pages 
162,163) Jordan ( i b i d , page 488) Schrodinger (1935- "States of a microscopic 
system which could be told apart by a macroscopic observation are d i s t i n c t 
from each other whether they are observed or not")Blokhintsev (1964), Fock 
(1965), Groenewald (Bastin 1971 page 43), Bunge (I b i d page 163), Lande(1965) 
Krips (1987), Bub (1974), Cartwright (1983 page 195), and many others. 
In t h i s connection one should note the very widespread tendency 
among p h y s i c i s t s to apply the term "measurement" in such a broad sense that 
i t becomes p r a c t i c a l l y synonymous with "interaction". Sudbery (1984) noted 
that i t i s "universally assumed in textbooks and research papers alike that 
decaying systems decay at some defi n i t e time even when not subject to 
measurement" 
I t appears therefore that the elimination of any reference to 
measurement in the postulates of quantum theory gives r i s e to no problems. 
TO WHAT DOES THE SCHRODINGER EQUATION REFER ? 
Cl e a r l y the Schrodinger equation governs the time evolution of the 
s t a t i s t i c a l properties of quantum systems, in some sense of the word 
s t a t i s t i c a l . F i r s t I wish to argue that there i s no acceptable sense of 
to 
t h i s word for which quantum theory can be seen as the s t a t i s t i c s of systems 
of p a r t i c l e s . To do t h i s , I need to examine the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s normally 
regarded as e s s e n t i a l to a p a r t i c l e . 
For most people, a p a r t i c l e has a unique trajectory, along which i t s 
location i s a function of the time. I t must also conform to some minimal 
standards of dynamical behaviour, otherwise any interactions of a quantum 
system could be interpreted as evidence for a p a r t i c l e or p a r t i c l e s following 
t r a j e c t o r i e s of some "ad hoc" kind. Krips (1987) in t h i s connection 
requires a "minimally Newtonian property" such that p a r t i c l e s " w i l l not 
change direction without an external force being impressed upon them". I am 
not sure whether t h i s i s adequate. Wherever an electron produces a 
s c i n t i l l a t i o n on a fluorescent screen, could we not construct an "ad hoc" 
force f i e l d to account for i t s getting there ? 
I would prefer an adaptation of Krips' c r i t e r i o n , and require merely 
that a p a r t i c l e should have a trajectory, and that i t should be possible to 
iso l a t e the trajectory by screens and apertures which are supposed to leave 
i t unaffected. ( I t i s p r e c i s e l y our i n a b i l i t y to do t h i s for an electron 
t r a j e c t o r y through a screen with a pair of apertures which throws doubt on 
the p a r t i c u l a t e status of the electron). My adaptation of Krips replaces 
the need to identify the e f f e c t s of an external force by the supposition that 
we can recognise physical boundaries which we know to exert no force upon an 
electron in the relevant trajectory. 
The a v a i l a b i l i t y of such screens would then make possible the 
production of p a r t i c l e s with known values for both position and momentum. 
This was the basis of the arguments of Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (1935). 
Bohr's response (Bohr, 1935) in effect questioned the p o s s i b i l i t y of the 
required arrangement of screens and apertures. 
The argument started by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen took on a very 
different character as the years passed, and i t came, as w i l l be seen below, 
to be concerned with the reconciliation of quantum theory and the Special 
Theory of R e l a t i v i t y . At t h i s stage i t i s the o r i g i n a l matter at issue 
which concerns us. Eins t e i n and his colleagues assumed screens and 
apertures which defined but did not influence p a r t i c l e t r a j e c t o r i e s , and 
hence arrived at p a r t i c l e s with positions and momenta. Bohr sought to show 
that such arrangements of screens and apertures could not be constructed. 
Neither the Bohr-Einstein discussion, nor any other source I have 
been able to trace, has given me an altogether satisfactory account of the 
minimum e s s e n t i a l c r i t e r i a for particulate status. Since I believe that 
much of the subjectivism which has got into quantum theory arises from the 
supposition that the theory applies to p a r t i c l e s having too much in common 
with everyday p a r t i c l e s or with the p a r t i c l e s of c l a s s i c a l dynamics, i t i s 
perhaps better to s t a r t from the other end and show how limited i s the 
resemblance between quantum e n t i t i e s and c l a s s i c a l p a r t i c l e s . This w i l l be 
the basis for my supposition that quantum systems are always f i e l d s , showing 
particulate properties as secondary features. 
ARE THERE PARTICLES IN QUANTUM THEORY? 
One way of doing t h i s i s to take a particular instance of a quantum 
system supposed to be composed of p a r t i c l e s and show that these p a r t i c l e s do 
not s a t i s f y any reasonable minimal c r i t e r i a for p a r t i c l e status. Jammer 
(1974 page 169) mentions the ground state of the electron in the hydrogen 
atom for t h i s purpose. 
1( 
U = (aVTt)* exp ( -ar) (5) 
where U i s the Schrodinger function, r i s the r a d i a l position coordinate for 
the electron and a i s a constant. The energy of the ground state E i s given 
E = / 2m - e / r (6) 
where p i s the magnitude of the momentum vector and e the charge on the 
electron. 
Now E has the value -13.55 electron v o l t s . Hence p'^/2m, which i s 
the k i n e t i c energy of the electron considered as a p a r t i c l e , i s negative for 
any value of r exceeding a value R given by 
e^ /R = 13.55 
giving a value of R of about 2 A . ( I have allowed myself some f l e x i b i l i t y 
i n the choice of units so as to avoid m u l t i p l i c a t i v e constants) 
Now the pro b a b i l i t y of a hydrogen atom i n i t s ground state 
interacting with some other system as i f the electron were at a distance 
greater then 2A from the nucleus i s given by 
P = 4Tt r'^lul dr = 0.23 
In other words, i f we wish to regard t h i s electron as a p a r t i c l e , 
and U as a s t a t i s t i c a l function determining the frequency of configurations 
for the hydrogen atom i n i t s ground state, then 23% of hydrogen atoms in the 
ground state contain electrons with negative k i n e t i c energy. 
I am not of course supposing that anyone applying quantum mechanics 
to atoms and molecules thinks of the bonding electrons as particles. In 
valency theory f o r exair^jle, an electron s i g n i f i e s l i t t l e more than the u n i t 
by which a continuous d i s t r i b u t i o n of electron s t u f f can change, and i t i s 
the shapes and energies associated with these d i s t r i b u t i o n s which matter. 
However, i t i s not merely that the practitioner does not think of electrons 
i n molecules as p a r t i c l e s , rather that he would not be able to i f he wanted 
to! 
Such examples could be multiplied i n d e f i n i t e l y . However, a 
completely general statement covering a l l the special cases appears to 
require rather sophisticated mathematics to derive. The so-called 
"Uncertainty Relations", which are readily derived from the Schrodinger 
equation, are of no help. For a free p a r t i c l e , these have the form (Schiff 
1974, p.61). 
5x.5p > fi/2 (7) 
where 5x and 6p are respectively the standard deviations from t h e i r mean 
values of a coordinate x and i t s corresponding momentum p. Such a relation 
does not deny the existence of a p a r t i c l e with a d e f i n i t e position and 
d e f i n i t e momentum, since i t can be regarded as specifying the minimum ranges 
of values of x and p in a set of systems with the same Schrodinger function, 
each of which contains pa r t i c l e s with sharp values for x and p. Popper 
(Tarozzi and van der Merwe, 1985, p.4) i s among many who have taken t h i s view 
of the Uncertainty Relations. 
THE THEOREMS OF GLEASON ,KOf:KEN MD SPEC^ KER. 
For a general demonstration of the impossibility of f i t t i n g systems 
of p a r t i c l e s with sharply defined coordinates and momenta into the quantum 
theory we may turn to a series of papers generated by the work of Kocken and 
Specker (1967), based i n turn upon a purely mathematical theorem on the 
mapping of H i l b e r t spaces due to Gleason (1957). Important contributions 
were made by Maczynski (1971), van Frassen (1973) and others. Reviews of 
the implications of these papers are given by Krips (1987) and by Redhead 
(1987), and i t i s on these that I have in the main drawn in what follows. 
A quantum system i s characterised by dynamic variables, such as 
coordinates and momenta. These variables have a one to one relationship to 
linear operators i n the way described on page 8 above, and the eigenvalues of 
each operator are the possible values which can be exhibited by the 
corresponding djmamical variable i n an interaction with another system. The 
question then i s whether these exhibited values can be supposed to be 
possessed by the system iiranediately before the interaction. Unless they 
can, we cannot follow Popper and other r e a l i s t s of similar inclination in 
r e l a t i n g the Schrodinger function to the s t a t i s t i c a l range of dynamical 
variables, each with a sharp value i n any particular system. 
The Kocken-Specker theorem and i t s later developments showithat, 
unless we make what appear to me highly iniJlausible assumptions, a quantum 
system cannot possess a f u l l set of sharply defined dynamical variables. 
In p a r t i c u l a r , a system of p a r t i c l e s each with sharply defined position 
coordinates and sharply defined momenta, cannot be a quantum system. 
Now in presenting the matter i n t h i s bald and summary fashion I am 
taking grave l i b e r t i e s with the rigorous presentations i n the sources I have 
quoted. I t i s not by any means a simple question whether for any particular 
quantum system there can be said to be a one to one relation between 
operators of a part i c u l a r class and dynamical variables of the system. I 
believe, however, that attention to mathematical rigour i s not necessary to 
my purpose. I am concluding from Kocken-Specker et a l that the s i i p l e s t way 
of eliminating the sources of subjectivism i n quantum theory, through 
Popper's s t y l e of realism, i s not open to me. I f I am wrong in t h i s , then 
ray task i s that much simpler. However, I strongly suspect that Popper's 
realism i s untenable, and I w i l l therefore continue on the assumption that 
the commonly accepted implications of the Kocken-Specker results are 
essentially correct. 
I f the Schrodinger function i s not simply a source of pr o b a b i l i t i e s , 
i n the frequency sense, for dynamical variables in an ensemble of s i m i l a r l y 
prepared quantum systems, then what can i t be? Well, instead of treating 
the p r o b a b i l i t i e s as frequencies i n an ensemble, we can treat them as 
propensities of a single system to behave in certain ways ( I n fact I shall 
end up using both sorts of p r o b a b i l i t y , but l e t us put t h i s aside for the 
present). We do not then have to assume that the system before an 
interaction possesses the sharply defined coordinates and momenta that i t 
exhibits i n the interaction. The Kocken-Specker theorems then present no 
problems. 
Now there i s nothing mysterious about a system with such properties. 
An electromagnetic system produces a s c i n t i l l a t i o n on a screen which we 
int e r p r e t as an electron from the system interacting with the screen. We do 
not have to assume that immediately before the interaction there was a 
shsxply defineiri packet of charge, energy, momentum and spin at precisely the 
position where the s c i n t i l l a t i o n i s observed. A l l the quantum theory t e l l s 
us i s the p r o b a b i l i t y of such an interaction at a particulair time and place. 
I t does not t e l l us that the interaction was uniquely determined by the 
configuration of the system immediately before the event. Note that by 
configuration I mean a set of values for the coordinates and momenta which 
appear i n the Hamiltonian. I t may be that the behaviour of the system i s 
rendered determinate by other variables not appearing in the Hamiltonian and 
not recognised by present-day physics. The p o s s i b i l i t y of such "hidden 
variables" i s a highly contentious matter, but i t i s not relevant to our 
present purpose. For t h i s , i t i s a matter of indifference whether quantum 
systems are or are not essentially non-deterministic. 
An analogy may make clearer the account I am presenting of quantum 
interactions. A lig h t n i n g flash i n a thunder cloud has a well-defined 
system of tracks through the atmosphere. However, before the flash occurs 
the properties of the atmosphere i n the immediate neighbourhood of the tracks 
may be substantially the same as those over the much larger region through 
which the flash could have passed as a result of the prevailing charge 
d i s t r i b u t i o n . These charge d i s t r i b u t i o n s could be measured, by instruments 
in balloons, for example, and t h i s would allow a prediction that a flash was 
imminent in some region. The exact path of the flash would not, however, be 
predicted. 
Our thundercloud has another analogy to an electron as described by 
the quantum theory. Once a lightning flash has occurred in the cloud, a 
region around the f l a s h i s i n a state which cannot produce another flash. 
Similarly i f a system containing one electron produces a s c i n t i l l a t i o n at a 
point on a screen then the system loses the a b i l i t y to produce a 
s c i n t i l l a t i o n anywhere else on the screen. 
THE LOCALITY PROBLEM. 
I t i s at t h i s point that a simple propensity interpretation of the 
Schrodinger function raises the so-called l o c a l i t y problem. Starting from a 
state of a quantum system for which, to some approximation,values of 
coordinates and momenta are known, the time evolution represented by the 
Schrodinger equation may give r i s e to a state in which a particular 
coordinate has a f i n i t e p r o b a b i l i t y of being exhibited i n an interaction 
over an a r b i t r a r i l y large s p a t i a l volume. For example, an electron i n a 
radioactive nucleus capable of 0-decay may may be known to be inside the 
nucleus at a part i c u l a r time, but with passage of time i t has a f i n i t e 
p r o b a b i l i t y of detection at distances from the nucleus which become 
a r b i t r a r i l y large. 
Now i n the propensity interpretation of the Schrodinger function, 
the coordinates of an electron i n a quantum system need have no more l o c a l i t y 
than i s represented by a pr o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n over space. The electron 
need then be no more than a picturesque representation of the i n a b i l i t y of 
the f i e l d to manifest electron-type interactions at more than one place at a 
time i n the region covered by the pr o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n . As i t i s 
sometimes put, the electron i s called into being by the interaction i t s e l f . 
Between interactions, a l l we have i s a kind of fuzziness l i k e the chemist's 
representation of the 6 electrons in a benzene ring , the fuzz-density at any 
one point being given by the probability interpretation of the Schrodinger 
function. 
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The l o c a l i t y problem appears here in that an interaction at one 
point w i t h i n the space in which the pr o b a b i l i t y function has a f i n i t e value 
must immediately reduce the p r o b a b i l i t y function to zero everywhere else i n 
t h i s space. Since the space can be a r b i t r a r i l y large, t h i s appears then to 
require the effects of the interaction to be transmitted through the region 
at speeds exceeding the l i m i t iii^osed by the special theory of r e l a t i v i t y . 
Now I s h a l l deal later with the question of supposed c o n f l i c t s 
between quantum theory and the special theory of r e l a t i v i t y , and a l l I wish 
to do here i s to show that i f such c o n f l i c t s do not arise for other reasons, 
then the Kocken-Specker theorems do not necessitate them. As we have seen, 
these theorems throw doubt on the interpretation of quantum probabilities as 
frequencies of sharp values of variables i n a population of s i m i l a r l y 
prepared quantum systems. We have also seen that the interpretation of 
quantum p r o b a b i l i t i e s as propensities for a single quantum system involves 
d i f f i c u l t i e s with the special theory of r e l a t i v i t y . However, these two 
kinds of p r o b a b i l i t y are not mutually exclusive. Any one system in a 
population of s i m i l a r l y prepared quantum systems may not be able to exhibit 
the f u l l range of coordinates and momenta exhibited by the complete 
population, but t h i s does not mean that a single system must possess sharp 
values f o r i t s coordinates and momenta. To put the matter informally, the 
kind of fuzziness required to s a t i s f y the Kocken-Specker theorems i s far less 
than that given by the unrestricted time evolution of a non-stationary 
quantum system. 
For s i m p l i c i t y , consider again the electron involved in a B-decay. 
( I n order to avoid the rather questionable assumption that there are 
electrons inside an atomic nucleus, the l a t t e r can be replaced by a suitable 
spherical p o t e n t i a l b a r r i e r ) . By the Kocken-Specker theorems, we may not 
envisage the electron at a particular time as possessing determinate sharp 
values of coordinates and momenta. However, i t i s e n t i r e l y consistent with 
the Kocken-Specker theorems to suppose that at any one time the possible 
values of coordinates and momenta which could be exhibited by the electron 
are confined within much narrower l i m i t s than are given by a probability 
d i s t r i b u t i o n derived from the relevant Schrodinger function. In particular, 
there i s no bar to a supposition that at any one time the electron i s either 
s t i l l i n the nucleus, or i t has escaped and w i l l not return to the nucleus. 
I f the range of values of coordinates and momenta which can be 
exhibited by a single 6-decay electron i s less than that given by the 
s t a t i s t i c a l interpretation of the Schrodinger function, the extension of the 
range must be given by r e l a t i n g the Schrodinger function range, not to a 
single |3-decay electron, but to a whole population. This population 
includes electrons s t i l l w ithin the nucleus, whose number decreases with 
passage of time, and electrons which have escaped from the nucleus and are at 
varying distances from i t . 
Although the s t a t i s t i c s of quantum systems depend upon two separate 
sets of d i s t r i b u t i o n s , a r i s i n g from the indeterminate character of momenta 
and coordinates within a single system on the one hand and from differences 
between systems in an ensemble of similarly-prepared systems on the other 
hand, quantum theory gives no means of separating the effects of these two 
sources. I t would be plausible to suggest that the indeterminacy within a 
single system i s j u s t that required, and no more than that required, to 
s a t i s f y some form of the Heisenberg Uncertainty relations. This would 
ensure that the sharpness of d e f i n i t i o n of coordinates and momenta did not 
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exceeid that permitted by the quantum theory. At the same time i t l i m i t s to 
a very small region the a b i l i t y of one interaction to i n h i b i t another, and 
avoids any c o n f l i c t with the special theory of r e l a t i v i t y . The proba b i l i t i e s 
f o r systems approximating to Schiff's "minimum wave packets", l i k e the ground 
state of the hydrogen atom, would then be pure propensities. 
However, the quantum theory (at least i n the form with which we are 
here concerned) says nothing about such detailed matters, and for i t s 
p r a c t i c a l applications there i s no need to distinguish the rel a t i v e 
contributions of frequency i n a population and propensity within a system to 
the p r o b a b i l i t i e s i n the quantum theory. The importance of recognising the 
d i s t i n c t i o n between the two kinds of probability arises, not in the practical 
applications of quantum theory, but rather i n the development of a r e a l i s t i c 
and non-subjectivist interpretation of the Schrodinger function. 
THE SO-CALLED COLLAPSE OF THE SCHRODINGER FUNCTION AND THE SUPPOSED ROLE 
OF CONSCIOUSNESS. 
In the above account, as in other accounts of quantum systems, the 
Schrodinger function varies continuously with time i n accordance with the 
Schrodinger equation, but any interaction of a system exhibits one only of 
the range of p o s s i b i l i t i e s of behaviour permitted for the system by the form 
of the Schrodinger function at the time of the interaction. In the course 
of any interaction therefore the form of the Schrodinger function changes 
from one admitting a r e l a t i v e l y wider range of behaviour of the system to one 
permitting a r e l a t i v e l y narrower range of behaviour. This i s sometimes 
referred to as a "collapse of the Schrodinger function". ( I t i s more usual 
to speak of the collapse of the wave function, but I prefer to avoid t h i s 
term as inappropriate to a function dealing with probability distributions in 
populations of quantum systems). 
In so far as our account of quantum systems makes the ranges of 
values of coordinates and momenta a property of a population of systems, each 
with more limited ranges of values open to i t , the collapse appears here as a 
rather less dramatic event than i t does in other treatments. Nevertheless, 
as we have seen, some degree of indeterminacy in values of coordinates and 
momenta, at least to the extent corresponding to the "minimum wave packet", 
must remain. The quantum theory does not reveal the mechanism by which the 
shaxp values of coordinates and momenta exhibited i n interactions are derived 
from the probabalistic range of values given by the Schrbdinger function 
before the interaction. Nor does the quantum theory t e l l us whether the 
range of indeterminacy in the single system represents an essential l i m i t on 
the scope of determinism in the world, or whether i t i s a consequence of the 
presence of hidden variables, not appearing i n expressions for the 
Hamiltonians of quantum systems. 
This need not be a matter f o r surprise. S c i e n t i f i c theories are a 
sophisticated class of representations of the world created by the minds of 
men, but l i k e a l l such representations (including our concepts of every day 
objects l i k e tables and chairs) they are incomplete, giving accounts of 
limi t e d a p p l i c a b i l i t y to facets of r e a l i t y . There i s no reason to suppose 
the human race w i l l ever achieve a "theory of everything", and certainly the 
quantum theory i s not i t . 
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Now of a l l s c i e n t i s t s , p h y s i c i s t s have always been the most prone to 
supposing that they were on the verge of discovering a theory of everything. 
In Victorian times, physicists of great d i s t i n c t i o n denied that the earth 
could have existed as long as the geologists claimed, because physicists knew 
of no mechanism which could have maintained the energy production of the sun 
over so long a period. At the turn of the century, j u s t about the time 
Planck was applying quantum concepts for the f i r s t time to the energy 
d i s t r i b u t i o n i n black body radiation, and Einstein was developing the special 
theory of r e l a t i v i t y , bright young university entrants were being advised to 
enter disciplines other than physics, where a l l the interesting discoveries 
were supposed to have been already made. I n the 20th century, acceptance of 
Wegener's evidence for continental d r i f t was delayed for 30 years because 
physicists could not account for the necessary movements in the earth's 
crust. 
I n the case of the quantum theory, the exclusion of gravity from i t s 
scope and i t s prima facie s t a t i s t i c a l character made i t an exceedingly 
unpromising candidate as a theory of everything. Nevertheless, there has 
been a persistent school of thought i n physics which has sought some form of 
un i v e r s a l i t y f o r quantum theory. As Rae (1986) says, quantum theory "should 
be universally applicable. I n particular, quantum physics should be able to 
explain the properties not only of atomic scale particles such as photons, 
but also of macroscopic objects such as b i l l i a r d b a l ls or motor cars or 
photon detectors" Similarly Squires (1986, p46) says of his colleagues and 
forerunners i n physics that "we have claimed that quantum mechanics i s a 
universal theory and applies to everything".Shiraony(1989) too s^ipears to deny 
a l l p o s s i b i l i t y of dissent i n his bald assertion that "quantum mechanics i s a 
framework theory which ,according to prevailing present opinion,applies to 
every kind of physical system." 
Here then i s a contradiction. Giuantum theory i s supposed to t e l l 
us everything about the behaviour of physical systems, yet i t does not t e l l 
us how ranges of possible values for the variables of a system are reduced 
to a set of sharply defined values. Some degree of universality could have 
been saved (putting aside the exclusion of gravitation from the scope of 
quantum theory) by accepting a fundamental lack of determinacy in the 
physical world. The quantum theory does not predict a unique evolution for 
a quantum system because that evolution i s not uniquely determined. To the 
extent that i t i s , quantum theory predicts i t . 
However, there appears to have been a reluctance on the part of many 
of those interested i n t h i s question to accept that the physical world could 
be anything other than s t r i c t l y deterministic. There may have been less 
reluctance to admit a lack of determinism in mental phenomena, and t h i s may 
account f o r the emergence of an idea that would otherwise have had l i t t l e to 
recommend i t . This was that the physical world, l e f t to i t s e l f , was 
s t r i c t l y determined, but that i t interacted with mental systems which were 
not. While isolated from any mental system,the evolution of a quantum 
system i s governed by the Schrodinger equation. Analogies readily present 
themselves. A thunder cloud builds up a potential d i s t r i b u t i o n in a 
continuous fashion, but the onset and path of the lightning flash results 
from causes not involved i n the charge separation processes, and in contrast 
to the laws governing these processes the flash has a random character. 
S i m i l a r l y , ati'eases bui l d up in the earth's crust around the San Andreas 
f a u l t i n a continuous and predictable fashion, but the earthquake when i t 
comes w i l l appear as a random event. 
The par t i c u l a r kind of mental process usually supposed to perform 
the role of p r e c i p i t a t i n g discontinuities out of a continuously evolving and 
f u z z i l y defined physical world i s consciousness. Why consciousness I do not 
know. I t i s an elusive concept : conscious processes readily and regularly 
merge int o non-conscious processes. I f I consciously draw a deep breath do 
I propagate non-unitary transformations i n my surroundings, while leaving 
undisturbed unitary transformations i f my breathing i s l e f t to i t s normal 
non-conscious regulation? 
Even i f t h i s d i f f i c u l t y can be overcome, there remains the problem 
that an interaction of a system with a state of consciousness appears to 
require the "collapse of the wave function" to precede i t . After a l l , when 
I become consciously aware of a s c i n t i l l a t i o n on the screen, i t already has a 
sharply defined position on the screen, and a selection has already been made 
from the p r o b a b i l i t y range open to the quantum system. Does the physical 
system undergo a discontinuous transformation not because i t interacts with a 
state of consciousness, but because i t i s about to do so? 
Problems of t h i s kind led most (and perhaps a l l ) those who at one 
time or another entertained a role for consciousness to abandon i t . I am 
happy to follow t h e i r example. 
Indeed, a l i s t of those quantum physicists who either never thought 
that consciousness had an essential place i n the philosophy of quantum 
theory, or who considered the p o s s i b i l i t y and sooner or later rejected i t , 
includes most of the best known names in the history of the subject,viz, 
Planck, Einstein, Schrodinger, de Broglie, and Bohr ( I w i l l j u s t i f y my 
inclusion of Bohr i n t h i s l i s t below). Heisenberg (1959,p54) also seemed to 
make his position clear " I t ( i . e . the collapse of the wave function) applies 
to the physical world, not to the psychical act of observation, and the 
t r a n s i t i o n from the "possible" to the "actual" takes place as soon as the 
interaction of the object with the measurement device, and thereby with the 
rest of the world, has come into play, and i t i s not connected with the act 
of r e g i s t r a t i o n of the result by the mind of the observer" ( I would not of 
course follow Heisenberg i n assigning any special significance to the 
"measurement device" and indeed I am not sure that Heisenberg himself 
intended i t . He may have been following a common practice among quantum 
physicists of applying the term "measurement device" to any part of the rest 
of the world which happens to interact with the quantum system i n which they 
are interested. However t h i s may be, i t does not weaken Heisenberg's 
rejection of a role f o r consciousness) 
Heisenberg(1959,page 91) also dismisses the o r i g i n a l reason for 
introducing consciousness when he writes that "the limitations of an 
axiomatic system w i l l be found by experiment the limitations cannot be 
derived from the concepts." 
Jordan placed the collapse of the wave function at an interaction 
with a macroscopic object (Jammer 1974,p488) and so denied any effect from an 
interaction with consciousness. The l i s t could be continued, but perhaps 
the most interesting case i s that of E.P.Wigner, who did so much to promote 
the idea that quantum theory involved essential reference to an observer. 
In the end, Wigner concluded that "the generally accepted formulation ( i . e . 
that which postulated observer influences) can have only a limited v a l i d i t y " . 
THE LIMITED SCOPE OF Q^ A^ T^UM THEOFlY ; EHREf^ FEST'S THEOFiEM THE HARMONIC 
OSCILLATOR. 
I t has been seen that the philosophical d i f f i c u l t i e s of quantum 
theory arise i n part from the assumption that the theory i s not limited in 
i t s application to certain basic f i e l d structures, but applies also to 
mechanical systems generally. In particular, the attempt to apply quantum 
mechanics to everyday objects leads to the measurement problems and the 
Schrodinger cat paradox. I w i l l now argue that certain results from within 
quantum theory i t s e l f suggest that i t cannot apply to macroscopic systems of 
the kind covered by classical mechanics. I w i l l do t h i s in two ways, one 
depending upon Ehrenfest's theorem, and the other upon Schrodinger's 
treatment of the harmonic o s c i l l a t o r . 
Ehrenfest's theorem i s proved i n most text books on quantum 
mechanics (see Schiff 1986 p28) I t deals with expectation values of the 
variables of a quantum system. The expectation value of a variable i s the 
average value exhibited by a population of s i m i l a r l y prepared systems a l l 
represented by the same Schrodinger function U. In most text book 
treatments the reference i s of course to average values measured rather than 
to those exhibited i n more general interactions, but t h i s does not affect my 
argument. 
For the present purpose, we need expectation values of a coordinate 
x and i t s corresponding momentum p. These are written as <x> and <p> 
respectively and they are given by the equation below (Schiff 1986 pp27,28) 
<x> = U^x U dxdydz 
<p> U ^ dxdydz 
Here U i s the Schrodinger function of the system, and the integrals are taken 
over a l l the space i n which U i s f i n i t e . 
Now in general x and p cannot possess sharp unique values at a 
par t i c u l a r time t . However, t h i s i s not true of <x> and <p>. These do 
have sharp values which are functions of time only, and th e i r dependence upon 
time i s the content of Ehrenfest's theorem, deducible within quantum theory : 
d<x>/dt = <p>/m (8) 
d<p>/dt = -dV/ax (9) 
Now Ehrenfest's theorem i n t h i s form i s the usual j u s t i f i c a t i o n 
for claiming that classical mechanics, as applied f o r instance to planetary 
systems or b i l l i a r d b a l l s , i s siitply an approximation to quantum mechanics, 
applicable whenever the range of uncertainty of quantum variables i s 
negligible compared with the inherent lack of precision i n specifying the 
variables of the system in question. Equation ( 8 ) i s then supposed to 
j u s t i f y the usual classical r e l a t i o n between a component of linear momentum 
and a corresponding cartesian coordinate, and equation ( 9 ) to j u s t i f y 
Newton's 2nd law. 
I t follows that the coordinates and momenta of a Newtonian system 
cannot be variables i n a Schrodinger equation of a quantum system. Thus the 
solar system i s not a quantum system, and i t i s not sinply our i n a b i l i t y to 
wait long enough that prevents our seeing b i l l i a r d b a l l s leaking through the 
p o t e n t i a l barrier cushions onto the f l o o r . Nor i s i t siitply the fact that 
I am looking at i t which stops Schrodinger's cat from remaining i n a 
mysterious superposition of existence and disintegration. The dimensions 
and properties by which we specify and recognise planets and pets are not 
governed by quantum mechanics. 
Similar conclusions follow from attempts which have been made to 
represent the behaviour of the harmonic o s c i l l a t o r i n classical mechanics as 
a l i m i t i n g form of the behaviour of the quantum harmonic o s c i l l a t o r (Schiff, 
1986 p74) Once again i t i s found that the position coordinate of the 
classical o s c i l l a t o r i s related to an expectation value expression for a 
quantum o s c i l l a t o r , and that the classical o s c i l l a t o r cannot even in 
p r i n c i p l e be seen as governed by Schrodinger's equation containing a 
classical coordinate. Instead, i t appears as a Schradinger function density 
d i s t r i b u t i o n (or minimum wave packet to use Schiff's term) which oscillates 
without change of shape. The quantum fuzziness, or uncertainty i n position 
and momentum, i s contained within t h i s o s c i l l a t o r y wave packet. The 
position expectation value averaged over t h i s wave packet, which i s the 
equivalent of the position coordinate for the classical o s c i l l a t o r , has a 
unique sharp value at any p a r t i c u l a r time, and oscillates round the origin 
with a determinate amplitude and period. 
What i t comes to i s t h i s . Quantum mechanics applies to f i e l d s 
(most commonly the electromagnetic f i e l d , but also to f i e l d s corresponding to 
the strong and weak forces of p a r t i c l e physics). These f i e l d s are governed 
by equations containing variables with an inherent indeterminateness. 
However the theory i t s e l f generates entities,corresponding to those i n 
classical mechanics, which are characterised by variables (positions, 
momenta) which are e n t i r e l y determinate. These e n t i t i e s (classical 
p a r t i c l e s , planets, atoms, cats) are not susceptible to Schrodinger's 
detested "quantum jumps" and t h e i r states do not permit of superpositions. 
They are i n fact persistent features of an underlying quantum world, 
retaining the properties by which we characterise them for a range of values 
of the underlying quantum variables, without partaking i n the indeterminacy 
of the l a t t e r . 
However, as Squires(1989) has pointed out,the d i s t i n c t i o n j u s t made 
between Newtonian and quantum systems cannot be i d e n t i f i e d with that between 
macroscopic and microscopic systems. Thus the electron d i s t r i b u t i o n for the 
ground state of a hydrogen atom has a determinate shape and sharply defined 
position, although the electron i t s e l f i s indeterminate in position.The 
electrons i n a c r y s t a l form a macroscopic quantum system.. 
I t i s nonetheless true that macroscopic objects of everyday 
experience are Newtonian e n t i t i e s . In such objects the minimal 
indeterminancy required by the Kocken,Specker and Gleason theorems i s 
achieved at sub-molecular or i n t r a - c r y s t a l l i n e levels. The objects 
themselves are not i n any sense superpositions of latent states, such as the 
l i v e and dead states of Schrodinger's cat. 
T h i s account of Nevjtonian bodies i s to be d i s t i n g u i s h e d from 
treatments of macroscopic bodies such as those given, for example, by 
Prosperi ( i n Bastin 1971,p55)and by Cini ( i n Tarozzi and van der Merwe, 1985 
pl85). These authors wish to account for the properties of macroscopic 
bodies i n terms of a quantum substratum, without any reference to 
consciousness or observers, but also without assuming any "collapse of the 
wave function". The Schrodinger equation i s supposed to give a complete 
account of the time evolution of the microscopic substratum. Since t h i s 
equation does not give unique sharp values to the microscopic variables, the 
problem then i s to explain how dispersion-free macroscopic variables arise. 
I t i s also necessary to show how the time dependence of the macroscopic 
variables can be determined from t h e i r instantaneous values. 
As i n the account of the harmonic o s c i l l a t o r and the Ehrenfest 
p a r t i c l e given above, macrostates are presented as probability distributions 
over microstates. I t i s then sought to demonstrate that a large class of 
microstates are macroscopically indistinguishable and can be related to a 
single macrostate. This no doubt can be done, but i t i s by no means 
established that t h i s single macrostate embraces a l l the microstates allowed 
i n the p r o b a b i l i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n defined by the Schrddinger equation. 
Indeed, i f we demand that the microstates be based upon e n t i t i e s having the 
minimal requirements f o r p a r t i c l e states already discussed, then the Kocken, 
Specker and Gleason theorems appear to require the exclusion of some of the 
microstates. 
Bub (Bastin, 1971,p65) i s among those who have argued that some 
exclusion of microstates permitted by the Schrodinger equation must be 
accepted i f macroscopic bodies are to be associated in t h i s way with a 
quantum microstratum. However, I have no problem in accepting t h i s form of 
"collapse of the wave function", seeing i t merely as a continuous process by 
which the range of p r o b a b i l i t i e s exhibited by a system i s reduced from that 
permitted by the Schrodinger function. The f u l l range of p o s s i b i l i t i e s i s 
exhibited, not by a single system, but by a population of s i m i l a r l y prepared 
systems. 
I t appears to me, therefore, that Bub's objection does not apply to 
the account I have given of Newtonian bodies. 
TWO KINDS OF REDUCTIONISM 
A comment by Squires (1989) draws attention to the need to 
distinguish two d i f f e r e n t ways in which we can speak of reducing one theory 
to another more fundamental theory. One of these takes the comparatively 
simple form of replacing approximate relationships between the variables 
describing a pa r t i c u l a r system, i d e n t i f i a b l e i n both theories, by more 
accurate relationships. Thus both geometric optics and wave optics deal 
with d i s t r i b u t i o n of l i g h t i ntensity i n optical systems, but wave optics 
describe them more precisely, revealing small scale details not ^parent i n 
geometric optics. 
In a more interesting kind of reduction, i t i s not j u s t a question 
of replacing approximations by closer approximations. Rather the e n t i t i e s 
featuring i n the reduced theory are interpreted in terms of patterns of 
behaviour or structures i n the more fundamental theory. Thus in reducing 
thermodynamics to s t a t i s t i c a l mechanics, properties of single systems in the 
former theory.! such as entropy or the Gibbs function, do not appear as 
properties of single systems i n the l a t t e r theory, but arise from a 
consideration of population of systems. 
The reduction of Newtonian mechanics to quantum mechanics f a l l s into 
the second class. The formalism of Newtonian mechanics i s not an 
approximation to that of quantum mechanics. Rather i t applies to e n t i t i e s 
to which quantum mechanics does not apply. Nevertheless as Ehrenfest's 
theorem shows, Newtonian behaviour can be interpreted i n terms of quantum 
behaviour at a d i f f e r e n t level of structure. 
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ELECTEON DIFFRAC^ TIQN BY A PAIR OF SLITS. 
The d i f f r a c t i o n pattern produced upon a photographic plate by a 
stream of electrons passing through a pair of s l i t s i s quantitatively 
predicted by quantum theory, but the physical process underlying i t has 
always been a source of puzzlement. The electrons behave as particles in 
that each electron can be shown to arrive at a sharply defined position on 
the photographic plate. This i s shown most clearly i f the plate i s replaced 
by a suitable fluorescent screen. Furthermore, the d i f f r a c t i o n pattern i s 
exhibited even i f the electrons are so widely spaced that only one electron 
i s present in the apparatus at any one time. The pattern would therefore 
appear to be produced by p a r t i c l e s following defined trajectories and not 
i n t e r a c t i n g with one another. 
On the other hand, the pattern i s quite unlike the superposition of 
the pair of patterns obtained by electrons from a similar stream passing 
through one s l i t at a time, with the other s l i t closed. In t h i s respect, 
the stream of electrons behaves not as a stream of particles, but as a wave 
phenomenon propagated with a wavelength L related to the magnitude of the 
momentum p derived from the p a r t i c l e interpretation by the equation 
L = h/p 
where h i s Planck's constant. 
The behaviour of t h i s particular quantum system was interpreted at a 
very early stage in the development of the quantum theory by de Broglie. He 
regarded the region of the electron stream as the path of propagation of a 
p i l o t wave which controlled the t r a j e c t o r i e s of the electrons. The p i l o t 
wave reacted to both s l i t s , and i n particular i t s f i e l d function intensity 
d i s t r i b u t i o n at the photographic plate with both s l i t s open was not expected 
to be the sum of the i n t e n s i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n s produced by each s l i t singly. 
The f i e l d i n t e n s i t y d i s t r i b u t i o n controlled the a r r i v a l pattern of the 
electrons at the photographic plate, and t h i s explained why the a r r i v a l 
pattern was not the sum of the single s l i t pattern. 
In t h i s account, the electrons, not the waves, were the carriers of 
energy and momentum, so explaining the teir^orally and s p a t i a l l y localised 
a r r i v a l s at the photographic plate. Clearly the account I have given of 
p a r t i c l e phenomena i n quantum systems has a conceptual s i m i l a r i t y to de 
Broglie's. I t i s true that I f i n d i t more helpful to see the particles as 
manifestations of localised energy and momentum exchanges of the f i e l d 
i t s e l f . I n t h i s sense, the waves do carry energy and momentum but exchange 
them i n a less uniform fashion than the waves in Maxwell's electrodynamics. 
As I have already said, t h i s picture accords better with my view of 
quantum theory, at least i n i t s e a r l i e r stages, as an account of the small 
scale behaviour of the electromagnetic f i e l d . I t also avoids the 
d i f f i c u l t i e s of those who t r i e d to i d e n t i f y the f i e l d function generating 
de Broglie's p i l o t wave with the Schrodinger function. This i d e n t i f i c a t i o n 
i s of course inconsistent with the ascription of a s t a t i s t i c a l character to 
the Schrodinger function and with seeing i t as a property of a population of 
s i m i l a r l y prepared systems, rather than as a property of a single system. 
However, a more important cause for the r e l a t i v e neglect of the p i l o t wave 
picture was the i n p o s s i b i l i t y of representing the Schrodinger function i n a 
3-dimensional space except in the case of systems containing a single 
p a r t i c l e only. 
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In due course, the p i l o t vmvB theory was disentangled from t h i s 
mistaken interpretation of the Schrodinger function, and I suggest that i t 
has always played a greater part i n the mental pictures associated with 
quantum problems by working physicists than the concurrent philosophical 
discussions would lead one to believe. This i s i l l u s t r a t e d by the 
discussions which arose from Renninger's papers on wave-particle dualism 
(Renninger,1953,pl960) 
Renninger noted that the reduction of a wave function associated 
with the emission of a p a r t i c l e from the centre of a sphere would result not 
only from the detection of a p a r t i c l e i n one hemisphere, but also from the 
f a i l u r e to detect the p a r t i c l e in the other hemisphere. Since i t was 
d i f f i c u l t to believe that the occurrence of nothing at a l l could have a real 
physical eff e c t over a region of space, i t appeared that either the reduction 
of the wave function had already happened and that the non-detecting 
hemisphere played no part i n the process, or else that the non-detecting 
hemisphere did play a part i n the process as a boundary associated with a 
f i e l d process connected with the p a r t i c l e emission. The former view would 
be inconsistent with the kjiown effect of boundaries upon the p a r t i c l e -
emission processes (as i n the electron d i f f r a c t i o n case, where the second 
s l i t prevents electrons a r r i v i n g on the photographic plate at points which 
could be reached through one s l i t on i t s own). 
Born and Einstein were among those to see the explanation of 
Renninger's "negative result measurements" in some form of p i l o t wave theory 
(Jammer,1974 p493). As Born said "....both particles and waves have some 
sort of r e a l i t y but waves are not carriers of energy or momentum". 
LAilDfi AND GROUP PROPERTIES OF ELECTRONS. 
Another well estabished school of thought i n quantum theory which 
has much i n common with the interpretation I am advocating i s that expounded 
by Lande i n his well-known text book (Lande 1965). This ascribes properties 
to groups of pa r t i c l e s as a whole, l i k e the stream of electrons in double 
s l i t d i f f r a c t i o n , and on t h i s basis develops a l l the usual results of quantum 
theory. Stopes-Roe (1962) and others have pointed out that i t i s then 
d i f f i c u l t to avoid associating the particles with a f i e l d , since in electron 
d i f f r a c t i o n for instance each electron would appear to react to the screen as 
a whole. 
Papers relevant to a f i e l d interpretation of quantum theory have 
continued to appear, among them Shimony (1966), Born and Biem (1968), Pearle 
(1967 & 1968), Bloch(1968), and Krips (1987). ( Perhaps i t should be made 
clear that we are concerned here with f i e l d interpretations of the quantum 
theory of systems of particles,not with the quantum theory of the 
electromagnetic f i e l d i t s e l f . I do i n fact regard the former as reducible 
to the l a t t e r , but t h i s I think can be done s a t i s f a c t o r i l y only i f we dispose 
of the idea that there are such things as quantum systems of autonomous 
p a r t i c l e s ) . 
2.4-
STERN-GERLACH PROCESSES AND THE PROBLEM OF COMPOUND PARTICLES. 
I have pointed out the d i f f i c u l t i e s in supposing that the quantum 
theory describes the behaviour of part i c l e s , unless the particles are 
e n t i t i e s embedded i n f i e l d s . These d i f f i c u l t i e s remain whether the 
Schrodinger function i s regarded as a property of a single system or as a 
property of an ensemble of s i m i l a r l y prepared systems. 
Thus consider the beam of electrons producing a d i f f r a c t i o n pattern 
by passing through p a r a l l e l s l i t s . I f the intensity of the beam i s reduced 
so that only one electron i s l i k e l y t o be present i n the apparatus at any one 
time, we have an ensemble of systems made up of the succession of passages of 
one electron through one or other s l i t . A d i f f r a c t i o n pattern i s s t i l l 
produced, which i s quite d i f f e r e n t from the pattern which would have been 
obtained by superposing the patterns formed by two beams of electrons each 
passing through a single s l i t . 
Now, as we have seen, t h i s i s not a problem i f a single electron i s 
embedded in and influenced by a f i e l d reacting to the presence of both s l i t s . 
The f i e l d microstructure gives an array of possible tra j e c t o r i e s , one of 
which i s taken by each electron as i t passes through the system. 
To the rather limited extent that i t i s v a l i d to envisage the photon 
as a p a r t i c l e , a similar account may be given of the d i f f r a c t i o n pattern 
produced on a screen by the passage of l i g h t through a pair of p a r a l l e l 
s l i t s . The f i e l d pattern here i s that derived from ordinary wave optics, 
without any reference to photons. Photon tra j e c t o r i e s are the normals to 
wave fronts. Here i t i s less of a surprise that the d i f f r a c t i o n pattern 
remains i f the l i g h t i n t e n s i t y i s so far reduced that only one photon i s 
present in the f i e l d pattern at any one time, and that, as Dirac remarked of 
electrons, every photon interferes with i t s e l f . I t i s far less easy to 
think of a photon as divorced from a f i e l d than i t i s to do so for an 
electron, although I have argued that even in classical physics t h i s i s 
impossible f o r an electron obeying Newtonian mechanics. 
By seeing quantum systems always as f i e l d systems, and never as 
aggregates of autonomous p a r t i c l e s , we avoid one problem that faced the 
school of r e a l i s t s who regarded quantum theory as a s t a t i s t i c a l theory, i n 
the frequency sense, of ensembles of systems. I f the Schrodinger function 
does no more than present the r e l a t i v e frequencies of occupation of an array 
of t r a j e c t o r i e s , then i t would be very odd i f a p a r t i c l e , having followed one 
part i c u l a r trajectory, could then be made to interact with the other 
t r a j e c t o r i e s i t might have followed. 
That t h i s happens i s demonstrated very simply by considering the 
photon as a p a r t i c l e . I f a l i g h t beam of s u f f i c i e n t l y low intensity i s 
divided into two by a half-silvered mirror, then only one of these contains a 
photon and the other i s empty. Yet by recombining the two half beams 
interference patterns can be produced. Then we have the odd circumstance 
that the photon interacts with what i t might have done but did not. 
Now perhaps nobody i s worried by the need to accept the existence of 
a real f i e l d c o n t r o l l i n g a l l photon phenomena. More surprising i s the fact 
that the quantum formalism suggests that such interference between what 
happens and what might have happened i s possible i n a l l kinds of quantum 
systems. I f i t i s only the small magnitude of Planck's constant which 
prevents us s e e i n g quantum effects i n macroscopic bodies as everyday events, 
then i n an eternal universe a t r a i n running south from Doncaster through 
Grantham w i l l some day c o l l i d e at Peterborough with i t s e l f a r r i v i n g through 
Lincoln. 
I have already argued that railway trains are not quantum objects, 
even i n events occurring at a r b i t r a r i l y low frequencies. They obey 
Newtonian mechanics, not a form of quantum mechanics which happens to 
approximate closely to Newtonian mechanics except on rather rare occasions. 
There are, however, e n t i t i e s intermediate i n size and complexity between 
photons and railway t r a i n s f o r which the matter i s not so straightforward. 
I have already referred to a-particles, which we appear to regard as quantum 
e n t i t i e s i n the treatment of a-decay, but for which we would not wish to 
postulate some special a-particle f i e l d in which to embed i t . Would every 
possible atomic nucleus have to be given i t s own f i e l d ? Then what about 
molecules ? And do we not apply quantum theory to crystal l a t t i c e s ? 
I t i s time therefore to look at the apparent quantum behaviour of an 
e n t i t y which i t would be implausible to associate with i t s own special f i e l d . 
A convenient example i s the s i l v e r atom in Stern-Gerlach processes. 
The Stern-Gerlach effe c t depends upon the possession by the electron 
of a small magnetic moment. This i s not measurable or detectable for the 
free electron owing to the indeterminacy features of quantum e n t i t i e s (Mott 
and Massey, 1933, p42), but i t has important implications for bound systems 
of electrons, such as atoms and molecules. In these there may also be a 
magnetic moment contribution from the spatial motions of the electrons as 
well as from the internal spin which may be regarded as the source of the 
inherent magnetic moment of the electron. The magnetic moment of an atom 
has the discrete behaviour characteristic of many quantum phenomena in that 
the magnetic axis can assume only a f i n i t e number of inclinations r e l a t i v e to 
an external magnetic f i e l d . 
In a Stern-Gerlach process, the pole pieces of a powerful magnet are 
shaped to produce a magnetic f i e l d varying rapidly in space between them. 
This space varia t i o n causes a force on a magnetic moment, and hence the path 
of an atom with a magnetic moment i s deflected as i t passes between the pole 
pieces. Each permitted i n c l i n a t i o n between the atom's magnetic axis and the 
external f i e l d produces a separate deflected path which may be detected upon 
a photographic plate. 
We now confine our attention to the s i l v e r atom, which exhibits a 
magnetic moment corresponding to the internal spin of a single electron. 
This can take up two orientations i n the Stern-Gerlach apparatus, so that a 
beam of s i l v e r atoms produces two spots on the photographic plate. For a 
s i l v e r atom in the entrant beam, the quantum theory does not give a d e f i n i t e 
orientation f o r the magnetic axis but only a quantified probability for 
exh i b i t i n g each of the two possible orientations i n passing between the pole 
pieces. 
Each of the two beams leaving the pole pieces has a determinate 
orientation r e l a t i v e to an axis defined by the pole pieces. For a beam of 
low in t e n s i t y , the single s i l v e r atom i n the pair of deflected beams at any 
one time has a determinate p r o b a b i l i t y of detection i n each beam. The 
detection of a s i l v e r atom in one beam, for instance by a second Stern-
Gerlach apparatus, would reveal d i f f e r e n t properties from those of a s i l v e r 
atom i n the other beam. 
26 
Emitting aside the p r a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s of actually doing i t , l e t 
us suppose with Krips (1987,p79 onwards) that the two beams emerging from the 
Stern-Gerlach apparatus are recombined by passing each through a magnetic 
f i e l d a n t i p a r a l l e l to the f i r s t and equal to i t in magnitude and space 
va r i a t i o n . Krips claims that the recombined beam would then be identical 
with the o r i g i n a l beam, defined by a so-called "pure" state function. This 
would be experimentally distinguishable from a beam consisting of a 
s t a t i s t i c a l mixture of atoms with d e f i n i t e orientations with respect to the 
relevant external magnetic f i e l d s . 
I have some misgivings about Krips' analysis of an experiment which, 
as f a r as I can f i n d , has never been carried out. However, I do not dispute 
that experiments could be devised which would indicate the real existence of 
both beams when only one s i l v e r atom i s present at any one time in a Stern-
Crerlach process. 
Now l i k e Krips, aiid f o r that matter l i k e nearly a l l physicists, I 
regard each s i l v e r atom as occupying one beam only and not as having a ghost 
atom corresponding to i t i n the other beam. Nor of course do I regard i t as 
in some state of suspended p o t e n t i a l i t y i n both beams, waiting for an 
observation to consign i t i r r e v e r s i b l y to one beam or the other. Am I then 
forced to postulate a s i l v e r atom f i e l d f i l l i n g a l l space, in the same way 
that an electron f i e l d accounts f o r the influence of both s l i t s when each 
electron passes through one only ? And does t h i s lead on to the inplausible 
supposition of an i n d e f i n i t e l y large number of overlapping f i e l d s , one for 
each e n t i t y (atom, molecule, etc.) showing recognisable quantum behaviour ? 
Emphatically no! I see quantum theory as developing primarily as 
an account of the microstructure of the electromagnetic f i e l d . I t may well 
be adaptable without much modification to systems involving the weak and 
strong fundamental forces. This may involve the recognition of baryons, for 
example, as features of a baryon f i e l d in the same way as electrons and 
photons are features of a universal electromagnetic f i e l d . Such matters are 
outside my scope. 
With s i l v e r atoms, the case i s d i f f e r e n t . Silver atoms react to 
the universal electromagnetic f i e l d e n t i r e l y i n v i r t u e of the e l e c t r i c a l 
charge motions embodied i n them. I t i s the l a t t e r which correspond to the 
microstructure of the electromagnetic f i e l d embracing both beams in the 
Stern-Gerlach apparatus. There i s no place for a separate f i e l d to account 
fo r the mechanical behaviour of s i l v e r atoms. 
In t h i s limited sense, s i l v e r atoms, a-particles and the l i k e can be 
regarded as quantum e n t i t i e s i n a way that cats, b i l l i a r d balls and planets 
cannot. No problem appears to arise i n deciding where quantum mechanics 
ends and Newtonian mechanics begins. The empty beam in a Stern-CJerlach 
process does not carry a ghost atom : i t i s an electromagnetic f i e l d 
structure which can interact, i n ways predicted by quantum theory, with the 
bound electromagnetic f i e l d structure which constitutes the o r b i t a l electrons 
i n a s i l v e r atom. A l l the evidence suggests that t h i s i s how the practising 
physicist sees the matter. 
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THE COPENHAGEN INTERPRETATION OF QUANTUM THEORY 
I have argued that quantum theory can be freed from i t s subjectivist 
elements without a l t e r i n g i t s essential structure or l i m i t i n g i t s p ractical 
use, although I have had to abandon the supposition that i t applies in 
pr i n c i p l e to a l l systems.Bodies described by macroscopic coordinates, for 
example,are not quantum e n t i t i e s .Clearly nothing i s lost by such 
abandonment,since quantum theory i s not used i n practice for such systems.I 
have further argued that the resulting interpretation of quantum theory 
solves many of the puzzles that have been associated with the theory. 
I now wish to show that the interpretation I have given i s broadly 
that held by physicists using quantum theory i n i t s wide range of 
applications i n p a r t i c l e scattering, atomic and molecular structure, spectra, 
s o l i d state physics and so f o r t h . S c i e n t i f i c theories ( l i k e mental concepts 
generally) have successful application because of a certain isomorphism 
between aspects of t h e i r structure and aspects of a world existing 
independently of mental processes. Such a view loses much of i t s significance 
i f i n fact users of these theories have widely d i f f e r e n t conceptions of the 
systems and processes with which they are working, or i f in fact there are 
practising p o s i t i v i s t s getting by with patterns of recurrences in raw sense 
data. This i s a very contentious matter. To what extent do text books and 
s c i e n t i f i c journals exhibit a basic common conceptual structure in any 
par t i c u l a r branch of science? Practical navigators and calendar makers got 
on very well with geocentric concepts fo r millenia. Has not the quantum 
theory tliroughout i t s history been l i t t e r e d with competing interpretations, 
from Heisenberg's "potentia" to Maxwell's "propensitons" and from "wavicles" 
to "many-worlds"? 
Yes i t has,but I suggest that interpretations d i f f e r i n g widely from 
mine are not present i n the minds of practising quantum physicists.Does the 
chemist visualise the benzene molecule multiplying into disparate universes 
from nanosecond to nanosecond? Does the crystallographer think the spots form 
on his photographic plate as he looks at i t ? I t i s s u f f i c i e n t therefore for 
me to show that the interpretation of quantum theory which I am presenting 
has much i n common with broad streams of thought among practitioners of 
quantum mechanics over a large part of i t s history, and that i t i s not a 
colle c t i o n of speculations,irrelevant to the application of the subject, 
cobbled together to buttress a metaphysical doctrine. 
I have already shown the connections of my interpretation with the 
idea of ca r r i e r waves developed by de Broglie and his successors, and also 
with the idea of group properties f o r systems of pa r t i c l e s , as developed by 
Lande and others. I t may be argued that although these ideas have had 
considerable weight of authority behind them over some 50 years, they have 
always represented something of a minority school of thought. Surely i t may 
be said, the mainstream orthodoxy has been the so-called Copenhagen 
interp r e t a t i o n , associated with Bohr and Heisenberg and th e i r successors. 
I s i t not commonly accepted that the subj e c t i v i s t trends i n the philosophy of 
quantum theory have t h e i r o r i g i n i n t h i s Copenhagen interpretation? 
Yes t h i a i s commonly acceptsd^ but, in my opinion, wrongly so. As 
presented by Bohr, the Copenhagen interpretation had no subjectivist 
tendency, nor was such a tendency countenanced by Heisenberg, at least in his 
la t e r contributions to the subject. Nor was Bohr a p o s i t i v i s t , holding as 
he did that science was about what we can say about the world, not about what 
we can say about sense data. 
We can see t h i s best by looking at the problem faced by Bohr as 
early as 1913, when he had accounted for the energy levels of the hydrogen 
atom, as exhibited by the Bulmer, Paschen and Lyman spectral l i n e series,by 
the use of Planck's 1900 relationship between energy and frequency. 
E = h V 
where V i s the frequency of the radiation exchanging energy in discrete 
quantities E. To do t h i s Bohr had placed electrons, seen as charged 
p a r t i c l e s , with potential energies and momenta given by classical mechanics 
and classical electrostatics, i n orbits around a nucleus. He made the bold 
assumption that a selection of such o r b i t s , having discrete values for th e i r 
angular momenta, would be stable, remaining unchanged between emission and 
absorption of radiation. I n so doing, he i m p l i c i t l y denied the status of 
elctrons as pa r t i c l e s obeying classical mechanics and classical 
electromagnetics, since such par t i c l e s i n his or b i t s would have radiated 
energy continuously. I n other words his successful use of classical 
concepts had produced a picture of the hydrogen atom which denied the 
v a l i d i t y of these concepts. 
This contradiction continued i n later developments of the quantum 
theory, culminating i n Schrodinger's equation. To apply the l a t t e r to any 
par t i c u l a r system, a Hamiltonian function i s derived on the assumption that 
the system consists of charged particles with potential energies, positions 
and momenta with sharp determinate values given by classical mechanics and 
classical electromagnetics. The solutions to the Schrodinger equation 
however deny the existence of such pa r t i c l e s , as we have seen above. 
Bohr's response to t h i s problem made no concessions whatever to 
subjectivism or positivism. For him, quantum systems were not ghostly 
arrays of p o t e n t i a l i t i e s brought into sharpness of d e f i n i t i o n only by the 
a c t i v i t i e s of conscious minds i n observing them. Nor can I accept 
d'Espagnat's view that Bohr's interpretation included essential reference to 
measuring instruments (d'Espagnat, 1983). As we sha l l see presently, Bohr 
often stressed the relevance to a quantum process of the "entire measurement 
si t u a t i o n " or of the " t o t a l experimental arrangement". However, i t seems 
clear that i n using such terms, Bohr was re f e r r i n g to the t o t a l environment 
of the quantum process, which could of course include the screens and 
apertures i n electron d i f f r a c t i o n for example, but was not confined to 
measuring equipment, and i n the general case there need be no such equipment 
present at a l l . I n support of t h i s view, one need go no further than Bohr's 
o r i g i n a l paper on the energy levels of the hydrogen atom. These energy 
levels are stationary states, and no measurement processes are involved i n 
Bohr's analysis of them. The emission and absorption processes by which the 
energy levels change are not supposed to depend upon any instrument or 
observer-related interaction. 
What Bohr did i n fact was to accept the independent r e a l i t y of the 
e n t i t i e s such as electrons and electromagnetic f i e l d s which occurred i n 
quantum theory and also the f a i l u r e of classical mechanics and classical 
electromagnetics to account f o r the t o t a l i t y of t h e i r behaviour. However, 
"no content can be grasped without a formal frame", and t h i s formal frame 
must be described by "our customary points of view and forms of perception" 
(Bohr,1958). For Bohr, these were the concepts of classical physics. The 
l i m i t s of the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of these concepts were to be found by 
experience, and indeed these l i m i t s were for the most part derivable from 
quantum theory. Outside these l i m i t s , the classical concepts f a i l us, but 
they are s u f f i c i e n t for the purposes of defining the relevant boundary 
conditions of the quantum process and f o r interpreting the interactions of 
the process with i t s environment. I t i s of course customary to paraphrase 
what I have j u s t said by re f e r r i n g to the "experimental set-up" rather than 
to "boundary conditions", and to "measurements" rather thanto "interactions 
with the environment". My phraseology is,however, quite consistent with 
Bohr's position, and with the readiness of the practising physicist to 
i d e n t i f y any interaction producing a macroscopic trace as a measurement. 
For Bohr,then,electrons sure not classical charged particles with 
sharply defined coordinates and momenta,nor are groups of electrons classical 
f i e l d s exchanging energy and momentum i n processes continuous i n space and 
time. However, the classical concepts of p a r t i c l e and f i e l d are a l l we have 
for the purpose, and experience and the quantum theory i t s e l f are our guides 
i n choosing the appropriate concept for the particular situation. Bohr used 
the term "complementarity" to describe the relationship between a pair of 
classical concepts both of which are necessary for the description of a 
quantum process but neither of which i s s u f f i c i e n t for the description. 
However, the term has been used by Bohr and by others for so many other 
things that i t i s best avoided. 
Bohr resolutely refused to speculate on ways of modifying classical 
concepts so as to remove the incompatibilities. He and most practising 
physicists have appeared to claim that they have no need to do so, following 
Wittgenstein's dictum that "what can be said can be said clearly, and what 
cannot be said must be passed over i n silence". There are two things to be 
said here. F i r s t , i f physicists deny the need fo r , and the p o s s i b i l i t y of, 
a self-consistent account of quantum e n t i t i e s i n the practice of physics,they 
are not e n t i t l e d to give highly coloured accounts of such e n t i t i e s to learned 
symposia.Secondly,textbooks and journals do suggest that physicists make more 
use of mental pictures to guide the application of quantum formalism than the 
p o s i t i v i s t i c tendencies of many of them would imply.These pictures appear to 
be i n accord with the account of quantum theory I am presenting here. 
Bohr himself consistently maintained that "quantum attributes reside 
i n the entire measurement si t u a t i o n " . Surely here we have a recognition 
that quantum processes are not concerned primarily with trajectories of 
par t i c l e s but with boundaries of f i e l d s . He also saw the i n a b i l i t y of 
quantum systems to exhibit simultaneous sharp values for non-commuting 
variables as connected with "the i n d i v i s i b i l i t y of the t o t a l experimental 
ai-rangement" and "the mutual incompatibility of two such arrangements" 
(quoted i n Bastin (1971 p.2). Surely what Bohr has in mind here i s that the 
system boundaries determine what kind of variable can be exlnibited by a 
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p a r t i c l e (e.g. a sharply defined position in one set-up and a sharply defined 
momentum i n another) and that we must not manufacture paradoxes by supposing 
that we could have chosen some quite d i f f e r e n t variable to measure. 
I w i l l return to t h i s l a s t matter below i n discussing Einstein-
Podolsky-Rosen phenomena. Bohr's account of them appears to me to remove 
much of the mystifications associated with them, p a r t i c u l a r l y i f we see i t as 
a f i e l d account. 
One other aspect of the Copenhagen interpretation appears to me much 
more questionable. This i s the apparent supposition that the range of 
representations of the physical world available i n mental processes i s fixed, 
and does not change as the range of human experience widens. 
Thus Heisenberg (1959,p46) writes "The concepts of classical physics 
form the language by which we describe the arrangements of our experiments 
and state the results. We cannot and should not replace these concepts by 
any others. S t i l l the application of these concepts i s limited by the 
relations of uncertainty. We must keep in mind t h i s limited range of 
a p p l i c a b i l i t y of the classical concepts while using them, but we cannot and 
should not t r y to improve them". 
The wording used by Heisenberg i s interesting. I f one cannot 
improve these concepts, why i s i t necessary to add that one should not try? 
Such a ban would have prevented the development of science as i t i s today. 
18th century technology got quite a long way i n heat engine practice, and 
vastly extended the scope of mining operations as a result, by regarding 
heat as a f l u i d , caloric, flowing down a temperature gradient. Carnot even 
got as f a r as formulating a version of the 2nd Law of Thermodynamics (well 
before the 1st Law was formulated, oddly enough) in the caloric theory. 
Newcomen and Carnot did very well with the only concepts available to them i n 
t h e i r time, but later developments would have been seriously hindered i f 
t h e i r successors had not improved these concepts. 
Mankind has extended and improved i t s conceptual representations of 
r e a l i t y over mi l l i o n s of years and w i l l continue to do so. Concepts 
enployed i n quantum theory are no exception, and the f i e l d interpretations 
discussed i n t h i s paper show one direction i n which physicists have extended 
and refined t h e i r mental models of quantum e n t i t i e s . 
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SEPARABILITY IN QUANTUM SYSTEMS 
An interesting feature of quantum mechanics i s i t s apparent f a i l u r e 
to allow f o r the separation of a system into two non-interacting sub-systems. 
However fa r apart they become, over however long a period, interactions of 
one appear to affect the behaviour of the other. I t i s not that these long 
distance effects can be d i r e c t l y i d e n t i f i e d , and s t i l l less that they can be 
used to exert a long distance control, variable at w i l l , from one place to 
another. I t i s rather as i f the range of behaviour open to one sub-system, 
s t a t i s t i c a l l y assessed, i s altered by an event involving the other sub-
system . 
The e a r l i e s t systematic study of t h i s phenomenon was made by 
Schrodinger (1935). He treated the problem i n i t s broad generality, but 
here a quite simple example i s s u f f i c i e n t . Consider a system with two 
degrees of freedom only, and suppose that on separation each sub-system can 
be completely characterised by one coordinate : x, for sub-system I and x^for 
sub-system I I . The combined system i s characterised by the pair (x, x^, and 
i t s Schrodinger function can be written U(x, x^. 
Since the two sub-systems can be i d e n t i f i e d separately, there are 
dynamical variables which can be specified for each sub-system, x^S x,^ 
themselves f o r example, or momenta or energies. The operators corresponding 
to these dynamical variables define eigenfunctions and eigenvalues i n the way 
already discussed. The eigenfunctions of x^are a complete orthogonal set, 
and can be normalised, and s i m i l a r l y the eigenfunctions i n x^.The Schrodinger 
function U (x, x^ can therefore be written as a series i n the two sets of 
eigenfunctions (Courant & Hil b e r t 1953, vol 1, p56) 
U(x# ^) - 2anV^(x, )w^(xj) 
Now suppose sub-system I I i s involved i n an event i n which the 
dynamical variable corresponding to the set of eigenfunctions Wn exhibits a 
value Wft (which must of course be an eigenvalue corresponding to one of the w^ 
say W(),). By t h i s event the Schrddinger function of the combined system 
becomes 
U(x, XjJ = a^V;^(x, )w/^(x^ 
Thus, as a result of the event involving sub-system I I , the part of 
the Schrodinger function r e f e r r i n g to sub-system I has altered, and with i t 
the s t a t i s t i c a l l y determined ranges of values of variables capable of being 
exhibited by sub-system I . 
Note that the event involving sub-system I I does not introduce any 
new possible values for the relevant variables of sub-system I . These 
remain r e s t r i c t e d to the eigenvalues corresponding to the eigenfunction v^ . 
However, t h e i r r e l a t i v e p r o b a b i l i t i e s of occurrence in an appropriate 
interaction does a l t e r , i n accordance with the Born s t a t i s t i c a l 
i nterpretation of the Schrodinger function. 
I t i s thus confirmed that no measurement on sub-system I w i l l 
reveal the event i n sub-system I I , since the result of the single measurement 
i s a possible outcome whether the event i n sub-system I I occurs or not. Nor 
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can one detect the altered p r o b a b i l i t y range by repeating the measurement on 
sub-system I since the f i r s t measurement alters the Schrodinger function to 
an eigenfunction corresponding to the measured variable even i f the event in 
sub-system I I does not happen. (Jaimner, 1974,p212) 
The interaction we have here therefore i s not observable, nor i s i t 
needed to explain what actually happens, but rather an interaction inferred 
in order to explain what would have happened in circumstances which do not i n 
fact occur. In t r a d i t i o n a l logic, we might say we are concerned with the 
v a l i d i t y of propositions depending upon u n f u l f i l l e d conditionals. I t i s not 
surprising that we may be tempted to wonder what a l l the fuss i s about. 
Now clea r l y the fuss i s not about any problem in applying the 
calculus of quantum theory to the kind of situation we have been discussing. 
Nor do any new l o g i c a l inconsistencies appear of the kind we may be inclined 
to see when we construct a Hamiltonian for a system which turns out not to 
contain the e n t i t i e s assumed i n the construction. There appears to be no 
d i f f i c u l t y i n constructing systems of quantum logic which embrace the 
calculus eirployed. (Van Frassen and Hooker in Harper & Hooker, 1976 p221). 
Is t h i s a problem then with no significance in the real world, one 
that can be solved by a dismissive wave of the hand? Jeffrey Bub (1974) 
argues t h i s view very persuasively. A l l we need to note (Bub 1974 p83) i s 
that quantum s t a t i s t i c a l events cannot be f i t t e d into a classical s t a t i s t i c a l 
treatment, nor t h e i r measures mapped on a classical probability space. More 
p a r t i c u l a r l y (Bub 1974, pl48) we have made the mistake of ascribing to 
quantum systems sets of properties forming a Boolean algebra. 
Bub's approach requires no reference to conscious e n t i t i e s , 
measuring instruments with effects d i f f e r e n t from other environmental 
factors, or causal influences moving at super luminal veloc i t i e s . I t i s also 
d i f f i c u l t to disagree with anything he says. Perhaps the remaining niggling 
doubt i s over what he leaves unsaid. What kind of things are those that do 
not possess properties forming a Boolean algebra? I f events in systems of 
such things are not susceptible to classical s t a t i s t i c a l treatment, what 
basic feature of these things d i f f e r e n t i a t e s them from things which can? By 
leaving a large area of the map blank. Bub i s i n v i t i n g others to write there 
"here be monsters". 
I t i s worthwhile, therefore, to give some ejiplanation of quantum 
non-separability, based upon the ideas already put forward here. Though 
obviously not required for the successful use of quantum theory, and adding 
nothing to i t s scope, i t w i l l at least show that non-subjectivist 
explanations are possible. 
EINSTEIN-PODOLSKY-ROSEN PHENOMENON 
A part i c u l a r i l l u s t r a t i o n o f a system showing t h i s non-separability 
i s that described i n a paper by Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (1935). I t 
consists of a pair of pa r t i c l e s with coordinates measured along a particular 
d i r e c t i o n x^ and x^ - ,and corresponding momenta p, and p^ .-. Although the 
quantum theory cannot determine simultaneous sharply defined values for x, 
and p, , and for x^and p-^ , respectively i t can determine simultaneous sharp 
values f o r the quantities x,-Xi, and EJ+PJ, , since i t turns out that they share a 
set of eigenfunctions. 
Now consider two possible measurements which could be made on such a 
system. F i r s t x, could be measured, giving a sharply defined value f o r t h i s 
variable. Since x,-Xflt. i s sharply defined, the measurement also gives a 
sharply defined value f o r , Alternatively, p, could be measured, giving 
by the same argument a sharply defined value for P2^  , 
Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen made the assunption, which was in due 
course challenged, that since the separation of the two particles could 
become a r b i t r a r i l y large, the measurement of X j could not be the cause of the 
aquisition of a sharp value by x^ ,, s i m i l a r l y for p, and p.^ . Therefore, they 
argued, x, and Xj. , p, and must a l l have had sharp values in the system 
before any measurements were made. Since quantum theory procedures cannot 
produce sharp values f o r such a set of variables, i t was further argued that 
quantum theory must be incomplete. 
The purpose of the three authors was to show how a form of 
determinism could be retained for systems of particles with simultaneous 
sharply defined coordinates and momenta, despite the admitted practical 
success of a quantum formalism which could not predict them. Quantum theory 
was correct i n the predictions which i t made, but there existed real physical 
values f o r variables of quantum systems which i t did not predict uniquely but 
only i n s t a t i s t i c a l ranges. 
Now t h i s study i s not concerned with determinism. Clearly we l i v e 
i n a world i n which some events are connected by recognisable causal 
relations with some other events. Clearly too, we cannot id e n t i f y a 
s u f f i c i e n t range of such causal relations to account for a l l events in any 
a r b i t r a r y volume of space in a particular period of time from a knowledge of 
e a r l i e r events i n some region enclosing t h i s volume. Whether t h i s limited 
scope fo r causality i s a result of human ignorance, or whether i t i s a 
fundamental feature of the universe, i s a question which has always 
interested philosophers and i t may be that the history of the human race w i l l 
end with the question s t i l l unanswered. 
However t h i s may be, i t soon became clear that the paper by 
Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen was not going to change many minds on the 
subject. Although i t seems probable that Einstein at least saw the paper as 
a contribution to the defence of determinism, i t s main thrust was to 
establish the lack of completeness of quantum theory, and much of the 
subsequent comment was concerned with showing that t h i s had not been done. 
I t should be emphasised at t h i s point that the kind of 
incompleteness i n question here i s not the same as that I see in the quantum 
theory. I have argued eaj^lier that the theory i s incomplete i n the sense 
that i t applies only to electromagnetic systems and perhaps,in rather 
modified form, to systems involving the weak and strong forces. I t does not 
apply to macroscopic bodies or to gr a v i t a t i o n a l systems. I do not suggest, 
as Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen did, that i t i s incomplete because i t gives 
only s t a t i s t i c a l predictions of momenta and coordinates for particles which 
do i n f a c t possess determinate, sharp values f o r them. I hold rather that 
the e n t i t i e s to which quantum theory applies do not possess simultaneous 
sharp values f o r two dynamical variables unless the operators corresponding 
to them have a common set of eigenfunctions. 
I can therefore consistently support what became, I think, the 
majority view, that Bohr (1935) successfully rebutted the arguments given by 
Einstein and his co-workers on t h i s matter. Bohr denied assumption (1) 
above that the experimenter has the choice of measuring either the coordinate 
or the corresponding momentum of a pai-ticle f o r a particular quantum system 
i n a pa r t i c u l a r state, as defined by the relevant Schrodinger function. 
Bolir claimed that reference to the position of a quantum p a r t i c l e presupposed 
reference t o a specified physical arrangement, and i f t h i s arrangement 
allowed a precise value for a position coordinate i t could not give a precise 
value f o r the corresponding momentum. Bohr i l l u s t r a t e d t h i s by supposing 
that the value of x^-xj. was established by apertures i n a plane perpendicular 
to the x-direction. The value of p,+p.i could then be established from the 
t o t a l momenta of the two part i c l e s approaching the screen less the momentum 
transferred to the screen. The momenta of the particles approaching the 
screen could be made determinate by selecting them, again by the two 
apertures, from a stream of part i c l e s with undetermined d i s t r i b u t i o n along 
the x-direction. 
Bohr then showed that a screen and aperture system could not be 
arranged so as to select values for both X j - X j , and P,+Pi!^  . To select a 
value f o r x,-x^ ,the screen must be prevented from moving i n the x-direction, 
whereas to determine the momentum in the x-direction transferred to the 
screen the l a t t e r must be capable of movement i n the x-direction, since a 
fixed screen i s one which absorbs momentum without measurable response. 
Admittedly many doubts were raised about Bohr's analysis. There i s 
cer t a i n l y something unconvincing about the idea of measuring the momenta of 
electrons, say, by t h e i r effect upon a screen mounted upon springs. 
Arguments from imagined experiments have a doubtful logical status anyway, 
and perhaps they should not be based upon procedures too far removed from 
p r a c t i c a l execution. Even i f one puts t h i s on one side, on the grounds that 
the o r i g i n a l paper had not put forward any more pr a c t i c a l realization of the 
experiments, there remain doubts about the supposition that a pair of 
apertures would produce a pair of quantum pa r t i c l e s which would remain at a 
determinate distance apart f o r a time long enough for the proposed 
measurements to be made. Indeed, i n a comment on the o r i g i n a l paper, 
Epstein (Jammer 1974 p230) had claimed that the time dependence of the 
dynamical variables of the two part i c l e s should have been taken into account. 
Increasingly, discussion came to emphasise Einstein's assunption 
that a measurement on one p a r t i c l e could not have any effect upon another 
p a r t i c l e at an a r b i t r a r i l y large distance from i t . I f t h i s assumption 
cannot be sustained, the argument for simultaneous sharp values of and p^. 
p r i o r to any measurement no longer holds, since either of them separately 
could have been produced by measurements of x, or p, respectively. 
By the time therefore that a more p r a c t i c a l l y realizable version of 
the Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen experiment was put forward by Bohm (1951), 
the problem had become the apparent need for quantum causal effects to be 
transmitted at speeds greater than that of l i g h t . Before discussing the 
Bohm variant and i t s several p r a c t i c a l realizations we must therefore see 
what r e l a t i o n the problem of super luminal ve l o c i t i e s has to our main concern, 
the implications of quantum theory f o r the nature of mental e n t i t i e s . 
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ACTION AT A DISTANCE AND REDUCTIONISM 
Stated baldly, there appears no reason at a l l to believe that a 
physical world existing independently of and p r i o r to mental a c t i v i t y would 
necessarily exclude action at a distance. After a l l , Newtonian gravitation, 
which was regarded as a basic feature of the physical world for some 200 
years,has forces transmitting effects across space instantaneously. No-one, 
as f a r as I know, saw t h i s as j u s t i f y i n g s ubjectivist acounts of the physical 
world. Indeed, the contrary view that i t supports a materialist view has 
been more usual. 
Nevertheless, i t i s undeniable that the supposed need for action at 
a distance i n quantum systems has commonly been thought to support 
subjectivism. Two quite recent examples w i l l be s u f f i c i e n t , one of a 
physicist who welcomes such support, and the other of a physicist who wishes 
to r i d quantum theory of action at a distance because of i t . 
Mermin (1958) gives a popular account of the ej^^eriments of Aspect 
and his co-workers, which I consider below.As far as I can see,he deduces 
from them nothing of philosophical relevance except that they show action at 
a distance. However, t h i s i s s u f f i c i e n t for Mermin to e n t i t l e his paper 
"Is the Moon there when nobody looks? Reality and the Quantum Theory" In 
case the question mark i n t h i s t i t l e leads anyone to think that Mermin had 
doubts about the connection between action at a distance and subjectivism 
there i s also the sub-heading "Quantum Mechanics i s Magic", with no question 
mark. I think therfore we do no i n j u s t i c e to Mermin in ascribing to him the 
view that action at a distance, i f i t exists, implies that mental e n t i t i e s 
either create, or can vary a r b i t r a r i l y , the behaviour of physical e n t i t i e s . 
Now i t may well be that believers in magic f i n d a world that permits 
action at a distance a more congenial place than one that does not. 
However, I think that nothing Mermin says supports a converse view that 
action at a distance makes a b e l i e f i n magic more plausible. His arguments 
are not therefore a serious challenge to anyone who starts out from the 
b e l i e f i n the o b j e c t i v i t y and p r i o r i t y of physical e n t i t i e s v i s a vis mental 
e n t i t i e s . 
My second example presents much more serious problems. I have 
already referred to the work of physicists such as Marshall who wish to 
deduce much or a l l of quantum behaviour from minimalist adaptation of 
classical electromagnetism combined with the postulate of a stochastic 
vacuum f i e l d . Their work would, I think, embrace the objective I have here 
of ridding quantum theory of reference to mental e n t i t i e s , but would of 
course do t h i s only as part of some much larger enterprise which may or may 
not turn out to be successful. I do not think we need wait for t h i s outcome 
to decide whether physics can be presented without essential reference to 
observers. 
Marshall has presented his rejection of action at a distance i n a 
variety of papers, and i n one of these (Taxozzi and van der Merwe 1985, pp257 
- 270) he relates t h i s rejection to the concept of a f i e l d . The forces of 
nature, he claims, are always mediated by f i e l d s propagating through space 
with f i n i t e v e l o c i t i e s . "Any system, no matter how large and how 
complicated, interacts through f i e l d s propagating across the boundaries with 
i t s environment". Elsewhere (ibid,p88), along with Santos and S e l l e r i , he 
=J6 
adds " A l l known interactions (gravitational, weak, electromagnetic and 
strong) decrease with distance, and hence physical connections between two 
atomic systems should go to zero as t h e i r mutual separation increases". 
Now I suspect that Marshall w i l l in the long run be proved r i g h t on 
these p a r t i c u l a r matters. I would however regard them as subject to 
empirical t e s t . I would also claim that the discovery of a force propagated 
instantaneously, or not decreasing with distance, would give l i t t l e reason 
to assume the intervention of mental states (and s t i l l less reason to suppose 
that the moon ceases to exist when we shut our eyes). I shall argue below 
that there i s as yet no experimental demonstration of action at a distance, 
nor l i k e l y to be any i n the foreseeable future. Where I cannot follow 
Marshall ,however, i s i n the apparent beli e f that he can rule out action at a 
distance i n an a p r i o r i fashion, saying (Marshall 1988, p4) that the 
abandonment of the p r i n c i p l e of local action means the reversion from science 
to magic and (Marshall 1986) that an analysis which i s non-local cannot be 
s c i e n t i f i c . Was Newtonian mechanics non-scientific or magical? 
ACTION AT A DISTANCE: AN EMPIRICAL QUESTION ? 
I suspect that Marshall's preoccupation here i s not simply with i n f i n i t e 
speeds of propagation, but more generally with speeds exceeding that of 
l i g h t . He may well be r i g h t that our conceptions of the world necessarily 
rest i n some causal framework, and that " t h i s means i n s i s t i n g on the normal 
macroscopic notions of 'past' and 'future'". (Marshall i n Tarozzi and van der 
Merwe, 1985 p267). I f the space and time coordinates which occur in the 
Schrodinger equation belong to a frame of reference of the kind occurring in 
the special theory of r e l a t i v i t y , then propagation of a causal effect at a 
speed greater than that of l i g h t w i l l permit interchange of the time order of 
cause and effect by a suitable coordinate transformation. Any acceptable 
notion of causality must have d i f f i c u l t y with t h i s . 
A serious problem here for the non-specialist i s that the 
philosophical problems of quantum theory have usually been discussed in terms 
of a n o n - r e l a t i v i s t i c form of the theory. R e l a t i v i s t i c forms of the theory 
do ex i s t , but there appear to be doubts whether these s a t i s f a c t o r i l y 
reconcile quantum theory and the special theory of r e l a t i v i t y . Marshall and 
Santos (1988 pl88) believe they do not, and quote Dirac (1976) as supporting 
t h i s view. However, a continuing problem of reconciling quantum theory and 
the special theory of r e l a t i v i t y , however much of a puzzle i t i s within 
physics, i s not necessarily one i n philosophy. 
As Bitsakis (Tarozzi and van der Merwe 1985, p72) has put i t , 
" l o c a l i t y i s not a necessary condition for a r e a l i s t i c and causal conception 
of quantum mechanics, because i t i s possible to imagine,and eventually 
discover, more general forms of determinism than the known r e l a t i v i s t i c local 
ones" Such more general forms seem to me not to be demonstrated by the 
experiments I discuss below, but I do not see how they can be excluded on a 
p r i o r i grounds. 
Marshall and Mermin represent highly contrasting forms of the view 
that to entertain superluminal propagation opens the door to magic and 
mysticism or, more prosaically, to the non-eliminable observer. There has 
on the other hand, been a strong school of thought i n physics which has 
accepted superluminal propagation within a broadly r e a l i s t i c and causal 
interpretation of the quantum theory. The hidden variable theories, 
developed over more than 30 years by Bohra and his associates, f a l l into t h i s 
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class. (A recent paper, Dewidney, Holland, Kyprianidis and Vigier 1988, 
gives e a r l i e r references). I do not deal with such theories, because I seek 
a r e a l i s t account of what working physicists do and of the concepts they 
employ, and i t appears to me that working physicists have not made pract i c a l 
use of hidden variables i n quantum theory. This does not exclude the 
p o s s i b i l i t y that at some time some form of hidden variable theory may turn 
out t o be true. I t i s simply that i f t h i s does not happen i t w i l l have 
l i t t l e relevance to the v a l i d i t y of simpler non-subjectivist accounts of 
quantum theory, such as the one I am discussing. 
To sum up, I believe that i f super luminal propagation of causal 
effects i s ever demonstrated, t h i s w i l l not have any subjectivist 
implications. Whatever the outcome of the controversies on the experimental 
work which I consider next, i t w i l l not throw doubt on the r e d u c i b i l i t y of 
mental states to physical states. 
My purpose i n discussing t h i s experimental work then i s not to 
dispose of any threat to my view of quantum theory, but rather to show how 
the application of t h i s view reduces the force of the argument that i t 
demonstrates superluminal propagation. 
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EMISSION AND ABSORPTION OF RADIATION IN QUANTUM THEORY. 
As I have said, I am concerned to show that the mental pictures used 
by working physicists in t h e i r employment of the quantum theory are 
s u f f i c i e n t to deal with the supposed philosophical puzzles of the theory. 
The experimental work most widely quoted to demonstrate appaocent non-
l o c a l i t y , non-separability or superluminal causal propagation involves the 
emission and absorption of radiations by atoms. Before I discuss the 
implications of t h i s experimental work, I wish to show that the conceptual 
account of quantum theory I have advocated i s i n general agreement with 
thinking among those applying quantum theory to energy interchange between 
atoms and the electromagnetic f i e l d . 
A t y p i c a l approach i s described by Loudon (1973). Consider a 
radiation f i e l d with an energy density W(n)dn at frequency n, exchanging 
energy with atoms capable of emitting or absorbing radiation of frequency n 
by transitions between an upper state 2 and a lower state 1. There are N/ 
atoms per cubic metre i n state 1 and N2. i n state 2. Then the rate 
processes are characterised by constants A^i ' ^ ZJ ^i1> such that 
rate of spontaneous emission = N^ . ky_, 
rate of stimulated emission - '^(") 
rate of absorption = N^  CitW(n) 
For our purpose the f i r s t question of interest i s the relation 
between the two kinds of emission, spontaneous emission at a rate independent 
of the radiation energy density and stimulated emission at a rate 
proportional to i t . Loudon (1973, pl5) gives the following equation, 
generally applicable to a l l atomic transitions 
kll = -hr? By/Tc^c"^ (10) 
where h, TC and c have t h e i r usual significance. This suggests some 
mechanism i n common between stimulated and spontaneous emission, 
characteristic of the f i e l d rather than the particular atom and atomic 
t r a n s i t i o n concerned. So-called spontaneous emission appears therefore not 
to be a process i n t e r n a l to the emitting atom : i t i s more natural to think of 
i t as induced by a ground state of the electromagnetic f i e l d , sometimes 
referred to as the vacuum f i e l d . This vacuum f i e l d i s not capable of 
giving up energy, and can be neglected for the treatment of many 
electromagnetic effects (but not a l l - see Loudon (1973) on the Casimir 
e f f e c t ) . The B;;, coefficient r e f l e c t s only the emission induced by the 
electromagnetic energy over and above that contained i n the vacuum f i e l d . 
The eff e c t of the l a t t e r i s reflected i n the A^, coefficient. 
This conceptual structure i s again revealed i n Loudon's treatment of 
the energy levels of the electromagnetic f i e l d i t s e l f (Loudon 1973 p9 and 
following). He derives these by regarding the f i e l d as an assembly of 
quantum harmonic o s c i l l a t o r s , each with the usual quantised energy levels. 
I t i s of course a characteristic of the quantum o s c i l l a t o r that i t s ground 
state retains an irremovable half quantum of energy, again showing the need 
for the concept of a vacuum f i e l d . 
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I t would be tempting to go even further and see Aj., simply as a 
combination of B2/ with an energy density for the vacuum f i e l d given by the 
co e f f i c i e n t •fin^ /TC^ c'' i n equation (10). However, Loudon's expression for the 
energy density of the vacuum f i e l d d i f f e r s from t h i s by a factor of 1/2. 
Clearly the semi-classical approach at t h i s stage of Loudon's development 
reveals very l i t t l e of the nature of the vacuum f i e l d . 
What i s perhaps more s i g n i f i c a n t i s that quantum f i e l d theory, which 
treats the electromagnetic f i e l d with fewer appeals to i n t u i t i o n based in 
classical physics, also presents spontaneous emission as a f i e l d induced 
phenomenon, ar i s i n g i n the same equation as the stimulated emission, and not 
i n a separate equation as i t does i n the semi-classical presentation. 
The above view of spontaneous emission clears away another puzzle: 
the electron i n level 2 i s i n a stationary quantum state, and in the absence 
of an external stimulus should undergo no transitions at a l l . 
The experiments r e l a t i n g to quantum non-locality we are about to 
consider involve "spontaneous" atomic emissions. I claim that I am 
following the conceptual processes of physicists working on interactions 
between radiation and atoms when I make the following assuitptions 
(1) The energy levels of the electromagnetic f i e l d are 
determined by a structure of " f i e l d modes" which 
always r e f l e c t geometric and other properties of 
the boundaries of the volume of space in question. 
(2) These f i e l d modes cannot give up the last half-quantum 
of energy corresponding to th e i r ground states. 
(3) I t i s t h i s ground state of a f i e l d mode which 
induces spontaneous atomic emissions. 
(4) The emitted radiation appears in the f i e l d mode 
which stimulated i t , and has i t s f i e l d properties 
determined by t h i s , i.e. i t has the same direction 
of polarisation as the stimulating radiation, and the f i e l d 
mode plus atom system s a t i s f y energy and momentum 
conservation conditions. 
Assumptions (1 ) , (2) and (3) are j u s t i f i e d by my ear l i e r 
discussion. Assumption (4) extends Loudon's remarks on emission stimulated by 
an external l i g h t source to emission stimulated by the vacuum 
f i e l d (Loudon, 1973,,p24). 
EINSTEIN,PODOLSKY AND ROSEN AND THE FREEDOM OF MEASUREMENT PRINCIPLE 
We can now return to the apparent need for superluminal causal 
effects i n quantum systems. As we have seen, Einstein and his collaborators 
ruled out such effects, and concluded from a consideration of a particular 
quantum system that a p a r t i c l e must i n fact have simultaneous sharp values of 
corresponding momentum and position coordinates. Quantum theory does not 
predict such sharp values, only s t a t i s t i c a l ranges. The f a i l u r e of the 
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quantum theory to predict sharp values does not of course rule them out ; the 
quantum theory could give ranges of values for populations of systems, each 
of which could exhibit sharp values. However,problems then arise from the 
theorems of Gleason, Kocken and Specker. 
We have seen how these las t problems can be overcome by regarding 
quantum p r o b a b i l i t i e s as the combined result of variations between 
populations of systems with the same Schrodinger function on the one hand and 
an essential indeterminacy of values of momenta and coordinates i n each 
system on the other hand. The indeterminacy within each system deals with 
the requirements of Gleason, Kocken and Speeker, and the variation between 
systems avoids the need to postulate superluminal causal effects within the 
li m i t e d spread of coordinates demanded of any one system. 
This s t i l l leaves a problem i n systems of the kind considered by 
Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen (1935). Here the coordinates f u z z i l y 
determined by quantum theory, namely x,- x^. and p,+ Pg. , define the 
configurations of the system, not i n one l o c a l l y confined region, but in a 
pair of l o c a l l y confined regions which may be a r b i t r a r i l y far apart. The 
coordinate x,-x.x may well be allowed a limited degree of indeterminacy within 
any one system of a population, so sati s f y i n g Gleason, Kocken and Specker. 
I t may also be allowed an additional variance over the population of systems 
so g i v i n g the t o t a l range of variance demanded by the quantum theory. 
Now, however, any interaction of the system exhibiting a value of x^ 
(or, as i t i s more narrowly put, any measurement of x,) not only fixes a 
value of X, but also a value for xa. which refers to a part of the system 
which may be a r b i t r a r i l y f a r from that to which x, refers. The limited 
fuzziness we allowed to x,-X;t no longer helps us : however limited t h i s 
fuzziness, i t s removal at x, forces i t s removal at Xiand we are back with 
superluminal propagation. 
Of course, quantum theory does not forbid the d e f i n i t i o n of Xj. as 
sharply as we may require. I t merely demands that the more closely x-z i s 
defined, the greater the range that must be available for Pi,. However, 
Einstein and his co-workers claimed to have described a quantum system in 
which both x^ ^ and p^ had to be sharply defined. Either x, could be 
measured, requiring a sharp value for X j , or p^ could be measured, requiring 
a sharp value for Pj(_ , Neither measurement disturbed the region of space to 
which Xa. and p^, referred, so that the sharp values for x^ and p.j^  could not be 
caused by the measurement process i t s e l f . Einstein and his co-workers 
claimed that t h i s meant that both x-^  and Pa. actually possessed sharp values 
i n the undisturbed system. Bearing i n mind Gleason, Kocken and 
Specker, are we forced to reject t h i s claim by accepting superluminal 
propagation of a causal effect from the region containing x, and p, to that 
containing xj^ and pj.? 
I have already described Bohr's comments on the 1935 paper. Bohr 
was not i n fact concerned with avoiding superluminal propagation, on the 
impossibility of which he probably agreed with Einstein. Rather, he 
rejected the supposed proof that xj. and pj, had sharp determinate values in 
the undisturbed system. In cases l i k e t h i s , i f quantum theory did not 
allow the prediction of a sharp value for a variable, then the system did not 
i n fact posess such a sharp value. As others (not I think Bohr himself)have 
put i t , the sharp value i s brought into being by the act of measurement. 
Bohr's answer was in fact a denial of what has sometimes been called 
the "Principle of Freedom of Measurement". We cannot in one and the same 
environment, or i n one and the same experimental set-up, have a choice of 
measuring either x, or p^ . In a system permitting a measurement of x, and 
hence implying a sharp value for x^ , we cannot measure p^,so no sharp value 
for p, i s implied. Similarly, a set-up permitting measurement of pj 
precludes the measurement of Xj . 
As I have shown, Bohr's argument i s easily f i t t e d into the picture 
of quantum systems which I am advocating here. I t s inportance for the 
present purpose i s that i t makes unnecessary any presumption of a 
superluminal causal influence from the region of x, and p^to the region of 
x-^ and p^ . 
Bohr described experimenta.1 conditions permitting the measurement of 
X j but not p, , and d i f f e r e n t experimental conditions permitting the 
measurement of p,but not x,. His examples did not, however, amount to a 
general proof that no experimental conditions could be found permitting the 
free choice of measuring either x< or p, • The problem for those who believed 
quantum theory implied superluminal propagation was to suggest experimental 
conditions which did permit such free choice. 
Neither the p a r t i c l e pair system proposed by Einstein and his co-
workers nor the measurement arrangements considered by Bohr had much 
prospect of p r a c t i c a l r e a l i z a t i o n . Practical ways of studying similar 
apparent cases of non-separability i n quantum systems were however suggested. 
The work of Aspect and his co-workers (Aspect, Grangier and Roger 1981, 
Aspect, Dalibard and Roger 1982) i s based on a type of test o r i g i n a l l y 
suggested by Bohm (1951). 
THE ASPECT EXPERIMENTS 
In both sets of experiments, Aspect and his co-workers studied a 
system i n which excited calcium atoms revert to the ground state i n two 
stages, emitting i n succession bursts of radiation of wavelengths 422.7nm and 
551.3nm respectively. This double emission f a l l s into a class for which 
theory predicts and experiment confirms that the two radiation packets have 
the same plane of polarisation. Pairs of emissions within a certain beam 
width pass to polarisers, one emission of the pair to one polariser set at an 
angle a , say ,to an a r b i t r a r y axis, and the other emission to the other 
polariser set at an angle b to the axis. Radiation transmitted through the 
polarisers reaches a pair of photomultipliers, one for each polariser. The 
signals from each polariser pass to monitoring devices which count the 
numbers of responses of each photomultiplier, and also the number of 
coincidences i n time of the responses i n the two photomultipliers. 
The correlated but separated events i n t h i s system are the 
re f l e c t i o n s or transmissions at the polarisers for the pairs of emissions 
from a single atom. These in turn determine the recorded events, namely the 
excitations of the photomultipliers. The question of interest then i s 
whether the pattern of correlations between pairs of photomultiplier 
excitations implies superluminal interactions between the events at the 
polarisers. 
To answer t h i s question, adjustments must f i r s t be made to the raw 
data, r e l a t i n g to imperfections of real polarisers and to photomultiplier 
e f f i c i e n c i e s . The nature of these adjustments depends upon a theoretical 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the relevant physical processes. Let me put t h i s matter 
on one side for the present, and assume we have suitably adjusted data. Let 
me also f o r the present confine my attention to the results in Aspect's f i r s t 
paper (Aspect, Grangier and Roger, 1981). Accepting the theory-laden 
adjustments, the proportion of coincidences between transmissions through the 
two polarisers R to t o t a l bursts of emission reaching the two polarisers R' 
i s given by 
R/R' - 1/4 (l+cos2(a-b)) (11) 
This expression i s suggested by certain theoretical considerations, and i s 
confirmed with i n experimental error by Aspect's results. 
So f a r i n t h i s account of Aspect's work, I have said nothing to 
prejudge the contentious parts of the interpretations of equation (11). 
In p a r t i c u l a r I have not yet used the term "photon", because c o n f l i c t i n g 
views on the nature of the photon underly c o n f l i c t i n g views on the 
i n p l i c a t i o n of equation (11). 
In i t s minimal interpretation, a photon i s no more than a convenient 
way of r e f e r r i n g to the discrete nature of energy exchanges between atoms and 
the electromagnetic f i e l d . There need be no e n t i t y corresponding to i t in 
either the atom or the electromagnetic f i e l d . However, in order to avoid 
superluminal effects within the electromagnetic f i e l d i t s e l f , some degree of 
l o c a l i s a t i o n of energy, in quantities corresponding to photons, appears to be 
necessary (see the discussion on the corresponding problem for electrons on 
page 13) Such localisation can be accomodated without much offending 
against the continuity features of the electromagnetic f i e l d (see, for 
instance, Prosser, 1976). In quantum f i e l d theory too., the photon has a 
rather shadowy status as a u n i t of occupation number of the energy levels of 
a pa r t i c u l a r f i e l d mode. 
Compared with these conceptions of the photon, some of those 
employed i n discussion of the Aspect ei^eriments give i t much more automonous 
character. I t i s imagined for instance as having a precise location in 
space, and a d e f i n i t e polarisation, analogous i n some ways to the angular 
momentum of a classical p a r t i c l e . The polarisation i s also supposed to be 
acquired by the photon at i t s time of emission from an atom, without the 
intervention of a pre-existing f i e l d structure. 
The relevance of t h i s i s that equation (11) cannot be reconciled 
with photon emissions uninfluenced by a f i e l d embracing emitters,polarisers 
and detectors without assuming causal effects t r a v e l l i n g between the 
polarisers at speeds greater than that of l i g h t . 
To show t h i s , we have to demonstrate that equation (11) cannot be 
s a t i s f i e d f o r a l l possible values of (a-b) i f the polarisation properties of 
the emitted pairs are unaffected by the polariser settings. A single 
example of such a f a i l u r e to s a t i s f y the equation i s s u f f i c i e n t , and I adapt 
one from a paper by Kraus (Tarozzi and van der Merwe, 1985 p84). 
Consider three possible settings for the polarisers, at angles 0, a 
and 2a to an a r b i t r a r y axis. I t i s convenient to consider coincidences 
produced not only when both of a pair are transmitted by the polarisers, but 
also when both are reflected. The two kinds of coincidences are equal in 
number, so that with an obvious notation we have 
C (0,a) - R'/2<l+cos2a) 
C (a, 2a) = R'/2(l+cos2a) 
C (0,2a) = R'/2(l+cos4a) 
where C (0,a) refers to the t o t a l coincidences, reflected and transmitted, 
for polarisers at angles 0 and a respectively, etc. I t follows that t o t a l 
non-coincidences are as follows 
N (0,a) = R'/2(l-cos2a) 
N (a,2a) = R'/2(l-cos2a) 
N (0,2a) = R'/2(l-cos4a) = R'sin 2a (12) 
where N (0,a) i s the number of pairs giving r e f l e c t i o n at one polariser and 
transmission at the other, etc. 
I t follows that since non-coincidences with polarisers at 0 and a 
are R'/2(l-cos 2a), and non-coincidences between a and 2a are 
R'/2(l-cos 2a), the non-coincidences between 0 and 2a are at most 
R'(l-cos2a). 
i.e. N (0,2a) < R'(l-cos2a) = 2R'sin*a (13) 
The expressions (12) and (13) for N (0,2a) are inconsistent, since 
4 ^ 
'sin 2a > 2 R'sin a i f a < K/4 
as can be seen by w r i t i n g the l e f t hand side as 
4 R'sin'^a cos^a. 
The inconsistency arises from the assumptions that the polariser 
responses of a pair of photons are fixed at the time of emission, that they 
are not influenced by the polariser settings and that the response of one 
photon to a polariser has no effect on that of the other.We therefore have 
the following choice: 
e i t h e r , c a u s a l influences i n quantum systems can travel 
at speeds greater than that of l i g h t , 
or, ( 2 ) , the polarisation properties of radiation 
emitted by atoms are determined by the 
surrounding electromagnetic f i e l d , which in 
turn i s affected by boundary conditions 
such as polariser settings. 
As I have suggested above, the second alternative seem to me to f i t 
i nto quite widely held views on absorption and emission of radiation. I have 
therefore no problem i n embracing i t and rej e c t i n g the f i r s t alternative. 
There are those who would reje c t both alternatives and I w i l l return to th e i r 
case i n connection with Aspect's second experiment. 
Before doing t h i s , l e t me be quite e x p l i c i t about the process of 
field-induced emission of radiation as i t applies to t h i s case. The vacuum 
f i e l d f i l l i n g a l l space i s the s i t e of a structure of ground state f i e l d 
modes. These have an objective r e a l i t y , and are not merely heuristic 
appendages to the use of the formalism of quantum f i e l d theory. Their 
structure i s determined by boundary systems, considered in the widest sense, 
including not only enclosures but also optical systems such as lenses, 
f i l t e r s , r e f l e c t o r s , polarisers and sources and sinks of radiation. The 
f i e l d plays an active part i n excitation processes in photomultipliers and 
i n emission processes i n atoms. The f i e l d mode inducing radiation emission 
determines the polarisation property of the emission. Since in t h i s case 
the f i e l d mode i s a property of a space containing polarisers and 
photomultipliers, the polarisation properties of the emitted radiation are 
determined i n r e l a t i o n to these particular devices. I t i s meaningless to 
ask how the radiation would react to polarisers with d i f f e r e n t settings. 
A l t e r i n g these settings a l t e r s the f i e l d mode structure, and in turn the 
emitted radiation. 
I claim that t h i s picture i s not very d i f f e r e n t from that i m p l i c i t 
in t e xt boolis on quantum optics ( c f Loudon, 1973). I t must be emphasised, 
however, that i t i s not necessary to be as specific about mechanisms as I 
have been i n order to reject experiments of the Aspect type with fixed 
polariser settings as evidence for superluminal propagation. A l l that i s 
needed perhaps i s to note the p o s s i b i l i t y that experimental arrangements i n 
place at the time the radiation i s emitted may determine the polarisation 
properties of the radiation. This i s certainly a logi c a l p o s s i b i l i t y , and 
i t i s not inconsistent with any generally accepted principles i n physics. 
The less specific grounds for rejecting the f i r s t Aspect experiments 
as evidence f o r superluminal propagation are, I think, accepted f a i r l y widely 
as v a l i d (see, for example, d'Espagnat, 1984 pp 229,230),and they are given 
by Aspect and his co-authors i n the paper which I w i l l now discuss. 
ASPECT'S SECOND EXPERIMENT. 
Clearly the presumed influence of the polariser settings on the 
polarisation properties of the emitted radiation becomes questionable i f the 
settings are established after the emissions have occurred. The experiments 
now discussed (Aspect, Dalibard and Roger, 1982) were motivated by t h i s 
consideration. 
The production of pairs of radiation bursts from suitably excited 
calcium atoms followed the lines of the f i r s t experiment, but now each of the 
pair of emissions was directed to a switching device and thence to either of 
two polarisers with d i f f e r e n t settings. At time intervals of the order of 
10ns, each switch redirected the incoming beam from one polariser to the 
other. Since the time of t r a v e l from the emission source to any of the four 
polarisers was about 40ns, the arrangement was intended to ensure that no 
stationary f i e l d pattern determined by the polou:iser settings met by the 
emissions could affect the polarisation properties of the emissions. The 
switching frequencies i n the two beams were not only d i f f e r e n t but 
incommensurate, so as to avoid the regular recurrence of time intervals with 
a p a r t i c u l a r pair of polariser settings out of the four possible pairs i n any 
one experimental run. 
As i n the f i r s t experiment, the proportion of coincidence to t o t a l 
emission was related to the r e l a t i v e orientation of the polarisers by 
equation (11) above. By the argument already given, such a relationship i s 
impossible i f the responses to the polariser settings are already determined 
at the time of emission, and i f , as appears to be the case here, the 
polariser settings cannot influence the emissions. 
I t appears to be agreed that the assumption of action at a distance 
can then be avoided only by challenging one of the steps made in processing 
the data. The photomultipliers have a detection efficiency of only about 
10%, and i t i s assumed i n the data processing that the radiation bursts 
detected are a random selection of those i n the relevant beam. I f , however, 
a detection depends upon a certain concordance between the polarisation 
properties of the beam and the s e t t i n g of the polariser, a given pair of 
emissions does not have to respond according to equation (11) f o r a l l 
possible settings. Emitting i t simply, i f the response i s inappropriate, 
the radiation i s undetected by the photomultiplier. 
This interpretation of the experimental results,without action at a 
distance,appears to be generally accepted as a l o g i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y , but many 
physicists who have written on the subject dismiss i t on the grounds that i t 
i s u t t e r l y implausible. (cf Six, i n Tarozzi and van der Merwe, 1985 pl71, 
Clauser and Home, 1974, and many others). 
P l a u s i b i l i t y judgments are d i f f i c u l t to ei'sluate. In my discussion 
of the experiments with fixed polariser settings, I gave a picture of events 
based upon a somewhat l i t e r a l interpretation of treatments of quantum optics. 
Let me see how t h i s can be applied to the experiments with variable polariser 
settings. 
Again we think of a f i e l d mode capable of inducing an emission from 
a calcium atom and also of exciting an electron in a cr y s t a l l i n e s o l i d i n a 
photomultiplier. Now, however, i n the 40ns or so separating an induced 
emission from the corresponding excitation, we have the channel connecting 
the two events interupted several times f o r 10ns intervals. We therefore 
imagine our f i e l d mode structure as a superposition of the four structures 
corresponding to the four pairs of r e l a t i v e settings of the polarisers. A 
pa r t i c u l a r burst of radiation from a calcium atom i s induced by one of these 
four coit^>onent f i e l d structures. I f t h i s burst of radiation meets a 
polariser s e t t i n g corresponding to the f i e l d structure which induced i t , then 
i t may be detected at the photomultiplier. I f the other burst of radiation 
from the same two-stage calcium atom t r a n s i t i o n also meets a polaxiser set at 
the appropriate angle, then i t too may be detected, and we may have a 
coincidence recorded by the monitoring equipment. 
For a pair of emissions from the same calcium atom tr a n s i t i o n , the 
p r o b a b i l i t y of a coincidence i s related to the r e l a t i v e settings of the 
polarisers which characterise the f i e l d pattern which induces the emission. 
This p r o b a b i l i t y has the r e l a t i o n of equation (11) to the angle between these 
two polariser settings. We cannot derive contradictions by considering the 
p r o b a b i l i t y of a coincidence i f the same pair of emissions meet other 
polariser settings : the photomultipliers would not respond and the question 
does not arise. 
As f a r as I can establish, t h i s picture i s not inconsistent with any 
well-tested physical theory. I f I am r i g h t , then the propagation of causal 
influences at speeds greater than that of l i g h t has not yet been demonstrated 
experimentally. 
Six (Tarozzi and van der Merwe, 1985,page 180) has objected to any 
account of t h i s kind that i t assumes the existence of two sorts of 
photons,detectable and undetectable. This seems wrong. What we have here i s 
not an assuiiption of the existence of undetectable photons, but an 
experimental demonstration of the existence of undetected photons.I take the 
non-detection to be systematically determined. Six takes i t to be random. 
Randomness here may mean that detection or non-detection i s determined by 
factors i n t e r n a l to the detector.For me detection,like any other form of 
absorption of radiation,is induced by a field,and the f i e l d structure i s 
influenced by geometric features such as polariser settings. 
I t has also been objected that the disturbance to the f i e l d pattern 
caused by the polariser switches should have caused departures from relation 
(11) between the r e l a t i v e polariser settiiigs and the proportion of 
COincidences.In fact (11) remained v a l i d for the second Aspect experiment. 
I do not f i n d t h i s surprising.The detection of a photon i s the result 
of an interaction between an electron i n a detector and a f i e l d mode and 
equation (11) i s a consequence of a d e f i n i t e relationship between two such 
f i e l d modes.The regalair interruptions to the passage of photons along the 
channels provided by the f i e l d modes would be expectedto reduce the number 
detected (a reduction i n detection was noted,but i t was explained 
d i f f e r e n t l y ) . The coincidences which are detected should s t i l l s a t i s f y (11) 
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BELL'S INEQUALITIES 
I t i s usual to ^ p l y the s t a t i s t i c a l tests known as "Bell's 
Inequalities"(Bell,1964) to the correlations i n experiments such as those of 
Aspect. Infractions of Bell's inequalities would show that the correlations 
could not arise from additional constraints inposed on the photons at time of 
emission. The correlations i n both series of experiments carried out by 
Aspect infringed the B e l l inequalities (Aspect et a l , 1981 and 1982) This 
infringement indicates the same feature of the ejjperimental results as the 
inconsistency I demonstrated between three applications of equation (11). 
The application of Bell's Inequalities i s a much more general test 
than mine, which i s r e s t r i c t e d to the particular case to which I applied i t . 
I chose the less general test because i t appeared to me to show more clearly 
the o r i g i n of the problem. 
However, as evidence for transmission of a causal effect between a 
pair of polarisers. Bell's test i s i n v a l i d for exactly the same reason as 
mine, namely the f a i l u r e to exclude the p o s s i b i l i t y of an influence on the 
radiation emission process by the polariser settings. (Pena, Cetto, Brady, 
1972). Aspect's second experiment purported to r e c t i f y t h i s flaw, and I 
have given my reasons for supposing that i t did not do so. 
ENHANCEMENT 
The kind of process to which I appealed i n rejecting the application 
of the B e l l Inequalities to Aspect's ej<periments belongs to a wider class to 
which the name "enhancement" has been applied. (Clauser and Horne, 1974) I t 
appears to be generally accepted that enhancement i s not ruled out for these 
experiments,or others l i k e i t , by anything i n current physical theory. 
Objections to enhancement therefore rest solely upon the supposed 
i m p l a u s i b i l i t y of the mechanisms assumed to be involved. Obviously I do not 
f i n d my own account implausible, but i f I am "sweeping the thing under the 
carpet" (Snowdon, 1987), I would appeal to Holmes' observation that when we 
have excluded a l l the probable explanations, an ijiprobable one must be 
accepted. 
Marshall i s consistent on t h i s matter. Since he rules out action at 
a distance on a p r i o r i grounds, he can take Aspect's work as proving the 
existence of enhancement phenomena. The version of enhancement I have given 
i s along the lines of a more precise account given in Marshall (1980).He has 
since offered a rather d i f f e r e n t version (Marshall,1989) which I do not 
discuss here. 
CONCLUSION 
I claim that I have shown that quantum theory, and the interpretive 
concepts r e l a t i n g i t to observation, can be presented without reference to 
subjective e n t i t i e s such as observers, conscious minds or measuring 
equipment. In so doing, I have made use of ideas which have been current 
f o r 20 to 30 years, and which to my knowledge have never been refuted. I 
have suggested that these ideas have always been close to those used by 
people when they have been practising physics rather than metaphysics ( I am 
not of course opposing the practice of metaphysics, but merely presenting my 
own version). 
In p a r t i c u l a r , I have sought to show that these ideas aire consistent 
with what i s often regarded as mainstream thought i n quantum theory, namely 
that of the Copenhagen school. My disagreement with t h i s school i s not over 
any s u b j e c t i v i s t tendencies, because neither Bohr nor Heisenberg (certainly 
i n his la t e r years) had any, but rather over th e i r non-evolutionary view of 
representations of the world i n human brains. 
I t i s true that I have taken a more limited view of the scope of 
quantum theory than i s commonly done, but my treatment does not, I suggest, 
exclude i t from any f i e l d i n which i t i s actually used, and t h i s i s surely 
s u f f i c i e n t . 
More recent worries over the foundations of quantum theory have 
centred upon i t s apparent incompatibility with the special theory of 
r e l a t i v i t y . I have shown that, however t h i s incompatibility i s resolved, i t 
provides no basis for a renewal of subjectivist accounts of quantum theory. 
On other grounds, however, action at a distance does give rise to 
uncomfortable philosophical problems. I have argued that no experiments 
carried out so f a r have i n fact demonstrated action at a distance, nor are 
such experiments l i k e l y , I believe, i n the foreseeable future. 
In the form I have presented i t , quantum theory i s no bar to a view 
that mind states are brain states, and brain states evolved from a pre-
e x i s t i n g physical world, operating according to laws unaffected by the 
emergence of mental e n t i t i e s of any kind. 
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